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In 2008, approximately 358 million travelers entered the 
United States, of whom 206 million arrived via land ports 
of entry (POEs) on the U.S.–Mexico border (1). Effective 
response to infectious diseases of public health importance 
among travelers requires timely identification and reporting 
to state and federal health authorities. Currently, notifications 
are made primarily by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officers to CDC quarantine stations. However, CBP 
personnel have competing priorities and limited public health 
training (2). To evaluate the utility of monitoring emergency 
medical service (EMS) dispatch and response logs for ill trav-
elers with symptoms or signs suggestive of infectious diseases, 
CDC screened medical records of patients transported by EMS 
during 2009 from the four POEs in El Paso, Texas. The screen-
ing was conducted using commercial software that monitors 
EMS logs and sends alerts in real time based on preestablished 
criteria (i.e., records containing keywords suggesting infec-
tious diseases). Records that met the criteria were forwarded 
to El Paso Quarantine Station personnel and reviewed within 
24 hours. If a reportable infectious disease was suspected, the 
final diagnosis was requested from the receiving hospital. This 
report summarizes the results of the evaluation, which found 
that, of 50,779 EMS responses in the city of El Paso, 455 
(0.9%) records met alert criteria, 86 (0.2%) needed diagnostic 
confirmation, and nine (<0.1%) were for reportable infectious 
diseases. Monitoring EMS logs can enhance detection of trav-
elers with serious infections at POEs but requires additional 
screening and follow-up by CDC.
CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine 
(DGMQ) is responsible for responding to communicable diseases 
in arriving international travelers that might pose a public health 
threat. Effective and timely detection of travelers with reportable 
infectious diseases is necessary for disease prevention and control 
measures, such as outbreak and contact investigations (i.e., for 
infectious tuberculosis and many vaccine preventable diseases) 
and monitoring of POEs for mass disease events with bioterrorism 
potential. CDC’s El Paso Quarantine Station has one medical 
officer and one public health advisor who are responsible for 
responding to these public health threats at 29 POEs spread 
over 1,200 miles of the U.S.–Mexico border. At POEs, CBP has 
agreed* to report to CDC quarantine stations any traveler who 
might have any of a number of clinical syndromes suggestive 
of an infectious disease of public health importance. However, 
CBP officers also must screen travelers rapidly for immigration 
requirements, criminal histories, terrorism intent, and illicit drug 
trafficking, as well as public health threats, while also permitting 
entry of persons engaged in commerce, tourism, or other lawful 
pursuits (2). Because screening and reporting of health threats 
might be limited by CBP’s broad mandate and need for rapid 
processing of travelers, the Institute of Medicine has suggested 
that new strategies be pursued to identify travelers for signs of 
communicable diseases (2). 
Use of EMS dispatch and response and emergency depart-
ment chief complaint data is an efficient way to detect conditions 
of clinical and public health interest (3,4). The four urban POEs 
that join El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico 
(Bridge of the Americas, Paso Del Norte, Ysleta, and Stanton) 
are particularly suited to such use because of the large numbers 
of crossings (31.5 million per year) and because the El Paso Fire 
Department’s computer-assisted dispatch and response system 
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integrates both 911 call center data and EMS clinical 
findings into a single electronic patient record. 
In this study, CDC evaluated the utility of 
monitoring El Paso Fire Department patient records 
using commercial software (FirstWatch, FirstWatch 
Solutions Corporation, Encinitas, California) that 
monitors EMS records in real time and sends an alert 
if the record meets the following criteria: 1) EMS 
response to one of the four POEs and 2) at least one 
keyword suggesting infection.† When EMS records 
matched these criteria, they were sent automatically 
by e-mail to the quarantine station medical officer, 
who reviewed the information in the alert (date, 
location of patient, chief complaint, and a brief 
summary of medical clinical) within 24 hours. If 
an infection reportable to the city of El Paso, Texas, 
or New Mexico health departments was considered 
possible, the El Paso Quarantine Station contacted 
the relevant hospital to obtain the final diagnosis. A 
final diagnosis was not requested for patients primarily 
transported for intentional or unintentional injuries, 
or for labor and obstetric conditions. These diagnoses 
were received within 24 hours for most patients. The 
primary diagnosis was  then coded by CDC using the 
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, 
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) (Table). To deter-
mine whether any of these patients had been reported 
previously to CDC by CBP, information was extracted 
from CDC’s Quarantine and Activity Reporting 
System (QARS), in which all illnesses, deaths, and 
other port-related public health events reported to 
quarantine station staff members are recorded. 
During 2009, El Paso EMS made 50,779 calls, of 
which 898 (1.8%) were to the four border crossings. 
Of these 898 calls, 455 (50.7%%) met the alert cri-
teria. Review of the alerts led to final diagnoses being 
† Keywords were as follows: Gastrointestinal group: abdominal pain, 
stomach pain/ache, cramping, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, bloody 
diarrhea, loose stools, decreased appetite, jaundice, botulism, cholera, 
Clostridium, cryptosporidiosis, salmonellosis, shigellosis, hepatitis A, 
norovirus, typhoid fever, weight loss; Respiratory group: influenza, 
tuberculosis, cough, cough with blood, sore throat, congestion, shortness 
of breath, breathing problems, difficulty breathing, influenza (flu), 
Legionnaires disease, melioidosis, pertussis, whooping cough, SARS, 
tularemia, anthrax; Dermatologic group: varicella, chickenpox, rash, 
redness of skin, swelling, sores, inflammation, discolorations, bumps, 
blisters, skin disorder, cutaneous anthrax, ulcers, hand foot mouth 
disease, measles, mumps, rubella, smallpox, shingles, MRSA, methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus, Staphylococcus; Systemic group: fever, 
febrile, elevated temperature, warm/hot, flushed, chills, clammy, 
sweating, infection, yellow fever, lymphadenopathy, brucellosis; 
muscle ache, diphtheria, malaria; plague, psittacosis, Q-fever, 
muscle ache, weakness; Central nervous group: polio, stiff neck, 
headache, meningitis, meningococcal disease, rabies, encephalitides; 
Hemorrhagic group: hemorrhage, nose bleed, bleeding, bruising, 
mucosal bleeding, headache, red eyes, dengue.
MMWR  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
 MMWR  /  June 4, 2010  /  Vol. 59  /  No. 21 651 
requested for 86 (9.6%) patients. Reportable infec-
tious diseases were identified in nine (10.5%) of the 
86 patients, including pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 
(five cases), coccidiodomycosis, Legionnaires disease, 
and invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae; nonreportable 
infectious diseases (e.g., urinary tract infection, bron-
chitis, osteomyelitis) were identified in 31 (36.0%); 
and a noninfectious condition in 46 (53.5%) (Table). 
Reportable infectious diseases were clustered in the 
fall, coinciding with the H1N1 epidemic (Figure). 
During the same period, 295 notifications in 
QARS involved the jurisdiction of the El Paso 
Quarantine Station. Of these, 27 (9.1%) were from 
CPB officers at the four POEs covered by El Paso 
EMS. Among those 27 patients, two (7.4%) had 
reportable infectious diseases (tuberculosis, Hansen 
disease), 15 (55.6%) had nonreportable infectious dis-
eases, and 10 (37.0%) had noninfectious conditions. 
Only two (2.3%) of the 86 travelers for whom a final 
diagnosis was requested and none of the nine patients 
with reportable infectious diseases were reported to 
the El Paso Quarantine Station by CBP. 
Reported by 
D Fishbein, MD, M Sandoval, MPH, C Wright, MPH, 
S Herrera, MPH, S Reese, MPH, T Wilson, MS, M Escobedo, 
MD, S Waterman, MD, S Modi, MD, J Keir, MPH, 
H Lipman, PhD, Div of Global Migration and Quarantine, 
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious 
Diseases; D Sugerman, MD, EIS Officer, CDC.
Editorial Note
The large volume of travelers crossing at international 
POEs makes identification and reporting of infectious 
diseases difficult. The results of this analysis indicate 
that use of EMS dispatch and response logs more than 
doubled the number of reports of probable infectious 
diseases identified and reported from the El Paso POEs, 
and increased by more than fivefold (from two to 11) the 
number of reportable diseases identified and reported. 
By identifying these patients at the time they were 
transported, the El Paso Quarantine Station was able 
to contact the receiving hospital and identify suspected 
cases while the patients were enroute to the hospital. 
Reportable diseases were identified shortly after the 
diagnosis was made and before they were reported to 
other health authorities by the hospitals. 
In addition to increasing the level of detection, 
automated monitoring of EMS response logs has the 
advantage of fostering interagency collaboration with-
out relying on additional human resources. Neither 
EMS nor CBP personnel needed to add to their 
workloads to report these cases because case informa-
tion was entered automatically into a computerized 
database and analyzed in real time, and cases of pos-
sible infectious disease were reported by e-mail to the 
El Paso Quarantine Station for evaluation. 
Although the use of EMS data in the early detec-
tion of reportable infectious diseases has not been 
studied previously, EMS data have been found to be 
a useful means for real-time syndromic surveillance 
for early detection of outbreaks and specific health 
TABLE. International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Edition, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) coding of final diagnosis for cases reported to 
the CDC El Paso Quarantine Station through monitoring of emergency medical service (EMS) logs and by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officers, 2009









Primary diagnoses by ICD-9-CM Not reportable Reportable† Not reportable Reportable†
Diseases of the respiratory system 22 3 14§ 5¶ 12 1 11§ 0
Infectious and parasitic diseases 16 0 12 4** 5 0 3 2††
Diseases of the circulatory system 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diseases of the digestive system 4 4 0 0 2 1 1 0
Diseases of the nervous system 4§ 4 0 0 2§ 2 0 0
Diseases of the genitourinary system 5 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
Diseases of the skin/subcutaneous tissue 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Injury, poisoning, external causes 2 2 0 0 3 3 0 0
Other or unknown 22 21 1 0 3 3 0 0
All 86 46 31 9 27 10 15 2
 * Based on final diagnosis by physician or on quarantine station assessment if final diagnosis by physician was not available.
 † Reportable to local or state health departments.
 §  Includes one case reported by both CBP and screening of EMS logs.
 ¶  2009 influenza A (H1N1) (five cases).
 **  Coccidiodomycosis, Legionnaires disease, hepatitis C, invasive Streptoccus pneumoniae. 
 †† Tuberculosis, Hansen disease. 
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conditions (3,4). In a study in Denmark, increased 
frequency of ambulance transport served to identify 
an influenza outbreak before it was recognized by 
other surveillance systems (3). In New York City, 
EMS diagnoses of difficulty breathing were 86.4% 
sensitive and 86.6% specific for cardiac disease, and 
71.4% sensitive and 93.6% specific for pulmonary 
disease (3,4). However, implementation of syndro-
mic surveillance systems should be weighed carefully 
against their potential public health utility (5) and 
cost to public health agencies.
In spite of the rapid identification of a number of 
reportable infectious diseases through surveillance of 
EMS logs, the number of cases identified was small 
and most did not require an immediate public health 
response. CBP did not report the majority of cases 
transported by EMS. This might be expected, given the 
relatively brief period available to CBP for detection of ill 
travelers as they transit through ports of entry. Although 
CBP officers are trained to identify and report travelers 
who appear ill with syndromic conditions such as those 
included in this study, most of the clinical information 
was not collected until the patients were evaluated by 
EMS. Unless the illness is plainly visible and unambigu-
ous, or travelers indicate that they are ill, in most cases 
CBP cannot detect illnesses of public health significance 
at the border. For travelers with medical emergencies, 
the focus is always on prompt transport of patients who 
require immediate medical care.
This study also highlights the difficulty of detect-
ing infectious diseases at the time infected travelers 
enter the United States (6–9). The large expanse of 
U.S. national borders, large number of crossings, 
limited federal resources, and need to allow the rapid 
movement of people and cargo make binational 
surveillance systems essential. Since 1997, CDC, the 
Mexican Secretariat of Health, and border health 
officials have implemented a variety of surveillance 
systems for infectious diseases as part of the Border 
Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project (8). 
One such sentinel influenza surveillance site in 
Imperial County, California, near the U.S.–Mexico 
border, was responsible for detecting one of the first 
two cases of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) (10). 
The findings in this report are subject to at least 
three limitations. First, the reported number of patients 
detected with an infectious disease likely greatly under-
estimates the true number of imported infections, 
because generally only those illnesses that pose immedi-
ate threats to life required transport by EMS. Second, 
when such patients are transported, EMS personnel 
do not measure body temperatures routinely to screen 
for fever, a crucial first step in nearly every infectious 
disease syndromic algorithm, and confirmation of most 
























FIGURE. Number of emergency medical service calls prompting alert and follow-up for possible infectious disease, by 
month and final diagnosis — U.S.–Mexico land border crossings, El Paso, Texas, 2009
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available on ambulances. Finally, surveillance systems 
based on symptoms and signs of illness cannot detect 
asymptomatic infections, nor most infectious diseases 
with protean symptoms.
The results of this study suggest that automated sur-
veillance of EMS logs can enhance detection of report-
able infections at POEs and supplement existing public 
health surveillance. To determine the ultimate value 
of this system, longer periods of study and refinement 
of the keyword search strategy based on performance 
characteristics are needed to determine whether travelers 
with conditions of greater importance to public health 
can be detected by this system. Surveillance based on 
EMS logs is only one component of a system that must 
include binational cooperation, data sharing, notifica-
tion, reporting, continuity of care, and preparedness. 
Systems to detect infectious disease in immigrants and 
refugees before international travel begins or after it 
is completed also are an essential part of surveillance. 
This is especially important given the modest value of 
interventions at POEs and the limitations of detecting 
ill travelers en route.
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What is already known on this topic?
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, 
whose primary task is law enforcement, also watch for 
and report illnesses of public health importance among 
approximately 206 million travelers who enter the 
United States across U.S.–Mexico land border each year. 
What is added by this report?
The El Paso Quarantine Station used a real-time com-
mercial software system that monitors emergency 
medical service (EMS) logs to identify possible infectious 
diseases reportable to local and state health authori-
ties. Nine patients crossing the border with reportable 
diseases were detected; none had been reported to the 
El Paso Quarantine Station by CBP officers.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Although automated monitoring of EMS logs can 
enhance detection of reportable infectious diseases 
in travelers, the yield is low and substantial additional 
screening and follow-up is needed by CDC.
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In February 2008, a group of U.S. residents became 
ill with symptoms and clinical findings suggestive of den-
gue fever after returning from the Dominican Republic, 
where they had traveled to work as missionaries. Dengue 
is endemic in the Dominican Republic and most 
tropical and subtropical areas of the world, including the 
Caribbean, and represents a known health risk for U.S. 
residents traveling to or working in those areas (1,2). 
Subsequent investigation by the Minnesota Department 
of Health (MDH), the Iowa Department of Public 
Health (IDPH), and CDC determined that at least 14 
(42%) of 33 missionaries traveling to the Dominican 
Republic met the case definition for dengue fever, and 
12 had cases that were confirmed serologically. Of the 
13 patients interviewed, all had weakness and fever, with 
12 reporting chills and body or joint pain. Ten patients 
had noticed mosquitoes inside or outside their house 
in the Dominican Republic, but only three had used 
repellent. Before departing on their trip, none of the 13 
ill travelers interviewed had been aware of dengue in the 
Dominican Republic, and only two had sought pre-travel 
medical advice. The Dominican Republic is a frequent 
destination for U.S. travelers providing missionary and 
humanitarian services and also for vacationers. These 
cases indicate a need to increase awareness of dengue 
prevention measures among U.S. travelers to areas where 
they might be at risk for dengue. 
In April 2008, CDC identified a cluster of blood 
specimens with positive dengue-specific immuno-
globulin M (IgM) antibodies among samples that 
had been sent to the CDC laboratory by IDPH for 
testing. Follow-up by IDPH determined that the 
positive results came from a group of U.S. residents 
who had traveled to the Dominican Republic, where 
they worked as missionaries. Through interviews with 
patients, IDPH noted that several other persons in the 
group, including persons from Minnesota, had become 
ill after returning to the United States. IDPH alerted 
MDH to the potential cluster, and the two state health 
departments identified additional dengue cases from 
test results received from commercial laboratories and 
through additional interviews. MDH, IDPH, and 
CDC launched an investigation to determine possible 
factors that might have placed the missionaries at risk 
for dengue infection.
Investigators determined that, during February 
5–18, 2008, a group of 33 missionaries from Minnesota 
and Iowa traveled to the Dominican Republic to assist 
with reconstruction related to damage after tropical 
storm Olga, which struck the country in December 
2007. The 33 missionaries each stayed approximately 
1 week in a tropical-style house in urban Santiago. 
The house had potable water, fans, and some window 
screens, but no air conditioners. During the day, the 
group participated in construction activities in mostly 
urban areas; members spent evenings on an open porch 
at their house. After returning to the United States, at 
least 14 (42%) of the missionaries sought health care 
for nonspecific febrile illness. 
For this investigation, a case of dengue was defined 
as illness in a person with fever and two or more of 
the following symptoms: headache, retro-orbital pain, 
myalgia, arthralgia, rash, or hemorrhagic manifesta-
tions, plus 1) a specimen with a positive dengue IgM 
antibody revealed by an enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) test or 2) no dengue-specific laboratory 
testing but a similar mosquito exposure pattern as a 
person with a positive laboratory dengue test result. 
In May 2008, investigators attempted to contact 
all 33 missionaries in the group, but were only able 
to identify those who had positive dengue test results 
or reported symptoms consistent with dengue infec-
tion. A trip coordinator refused to release the names 
of the other travelers, citing confidentiality issues, and 
attempts to have the identified patients relay interview 
requests to other travelers failed. Of 14 persons whose 
illness met the dengue case definition, 13 agreed to 
be interviewed regarding demographic information, 
travel history, activities, and behaviors, and to respond 
to questions regarding prevention measures and pre-
travel knowledge of the risk for dengue fever. 
Of the 14 patients whose illness met the dengue 
case definition, 12 had positive dengue IgM antibody 
test results, and two had similar illness and exposures 
but no laboratory testing. Of the 13 patients inter-
viewed, the mean duration of stay in the Dominican 
Republic was 7.6 days (range: 6–9 days). Median 
age was 53 years (range: 12–76 years). Eight patients 
were male. All 13 had weakness and fever, and 12 
reported chills and body or joint pain. Six patients had 
Dengue Fever Among U.S. Travelers Returning from the Dominican 
Republic — Minnesota and Iowa, 2008
MMWR  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
 MMWR  /  June 4, 2010  /  Vol. 59  /  No. 21 655 
abdominal pain, five had some form of bleeding, four 
had nausea or vomiting, and three had diarrhea. Two 
patients were hospitalized, and five reported being out 
of work from 6 days to 1 month. The mean incubation 
period was 7.6 days (range: 1–23 days).
Eleven of the 13 patients reported wearing long 
pants during the workday, primarily to avoid work-
related injuries and sunburn. However, none of the 
patients reported wearing long pants in the evening. 
All reported opening window screens and doors in 
their house to increase air flow, and eight noted the 
presence of mosquitoes inside their bedrooms. Despite 
having mosquito repellent available in the group 
supplies, only three persons used repellent. None of 
the patients used insecticides to treat their clothing 
or bedding; none used bed nets, recommended for 
general biting arthropod protection. None of the 13 
thought mosquitoes posed a threat to their health, 
and none were aware of the threat of dengue from 
mosquitoes in the Dominican Republic. Only three of 
those interviewed had heard of dengue previously. 
Before traveling, none of the 13 patients accessed 
online travelers’ health information or investigated 
health issues relevant to the Dominican Republic. 
None learned of dengue risk from trip coordinators 
or residents of the Dominican Republic. Only two 
patients visited a health-care provider or travel clinic 
before travel, and neither was provided with informa-
tion on dengue. One patient did receive information 
about malaria, mosquito repellent use, and protective 
clothing; she used repellent after being prompted by 
mosquito bites while in the Dominican Republic. 
Reported by
D Neitzel, MS, Rebecca Fisher, Minnesota Dept of Health Svcs. 
K Crimmings, MS, Cerro Gordo County Dept of Public Health; 
S Brend, MPH, M Hobson, MS, Iowa Dept of Public Health. 
CL Perez-Guerra, PhD, E Zielinski-Gutierrez, DrPH, JE Staples, 
MD, Div of Vector-Borne Diseases, National Center for Emerging 
and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (proposed), CDC. 
Editorial Note
In this case series, at least 14 persons (42%) devel-
oped dengue fever in a group of 33 U.S. travelers 
while performing missionary activities in a dengue-
endemic country for approximately 1 week. Similar 
dengue case series have been reported previously in 
the Caribbean. For example, in 1995, 22 (69%) of 
32 aid workers involved in reconstruction and teach-
ing activities for <20 days on Tortola, British Virgin 
Islands, developed dengue (3). In 1997, at least 
eight (16%) of 50 missionaries were infected during 
a 1-week service trip to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula 
(4). Similar case clusters likely will be reported in the 
future; dengue became a nationally notifiable disease 
in the United States in 2010.
Missionaries and other relief workers often travel 
to areas where dengue is endemic to assist in aid and 
recovery efforts. These groups are at particular risk 
for dengue infection because they work outdoors and 
stay in lodgings without screens and air conditioning 
(3,4). Repeated travel to dengue-endemic areas might 
increase the likelihood for reinfection with dengue 
and, therefore, increase the risk for severe dengue ill-
ness (e.g., dengue hemorrhagic fever) (5). As noted 
in a similar study (3), most of the missionaries and 
aid workers did not use recommended measures to 
prevent mosquito bites, despite mosquito infestation 
where they worked and slept. 
In 2007, the Dominican Republic reported nearly 
10,000 clinical cases of dengue.* Despite this, none of the 
13 missionaries interviewed were informed of the risk for 
dengue before their trip. Only two of the 13 sought pre-
travel health information. In response to this issue, CDC 
currently is working to develop partnerships to improve 
outreach to missionary and aid organizations active in 
dengue-endemic regions regarding the risk for dengue 
and the appropriate prevention measures (3,6–8). Efforts 
will include development of targeted messages and educa-
tional materials to be distributed within aid organizations. 
Opportunities to work with missionary and aid groups 
directly, as well as with Internet-based travel agencies, 
travel magazines, and adventure-travel clothing retailers 
are being explored as ways to alert travelers regarding the 
relationship between mosquito bites and dengue and to 
encourage routine use of personal protection measures 
such as mosquito repellent, protective clothing, and 
appropriate insecticide, especially when window screens 
and air conditioning are unavailable (8). 
The findings in this report are subject to at least one 
limitation. Only 13 of the 33 missionaries could be con-
tacted for interviews, and only 12 were tested for dengue. 
Therefore, a cohort study could not be conducted, and 
an attack rate could not be calculated. Because many 
dengue infections are asymptomatic or cause nonspecific 
febrile symptoms (9), additional infections might have 
occurred among the 33 that were not reported by the 
person or identified by a health-care provider. 
* Available at http://www.paho.org/english/ad/dpc/cd/dengue-cases-
2007.htm. 
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Dengue is a major public health problem in 
tropical and subtropical areas of the world, with an 
estimated 50–100 million dengue infections and 
20,000 deaths occurring annually (2). One of the 
most important mosquito-borne diseases among 
international travelers, dengue accounts for 21 of 
1,000 illnesses experienced annually by travelers 
worldwide and 32 of 1,000 illnesses in travelers to the 
Caribbean (7). As seen with the 2009–2010 autoch-
thonous dengue transmission in Key West, Florida, 
competent mosquito vectors are present in the United 
States, where conditions can allow for sizeable local 
outbreaks (10). Viremic returning travelers present 
an ongoing risk for reintroduction of dengue viruses 
to the U.S. mainland. Public health efforts to control 
Aedes aegypti, the primary mosquito vector for dengue, 
have not been completely effective (4,8). Currently, no 
vaccine exists to prevent dengue. However, multiple 
dengue vaccine candidates are being tested in clinical 
trials around the world that promise a better future 
in dengue prevention.
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What is already known on this topic?
Dengue is endemic in the Dominican Republic and 
most tropical and subtropical areas of the world and 
represents a known health risk for U.S. residents trav-
eling to or working in those areas.
What is added by this report?
At least 14 of 33 missionaries who traveled to the 
Dominican Republic in 2008 became ill with dengue; of 
13 who were interviewed, eight reported mosquitoes 
in their bedrooms, but only three used repellent, and 
none of the 13 considered mosquitoes a health threat.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Increased efforts should be made to coordinate with 
dengue-endemic countries to improve prevention 
and control efforts as well as to explain the risk for 
dengue and appropriate prevention measures to U.S. 
travelers, particularly missionary and other aid organi-
zations that visit areas where dengue is endemic and 
whose activities might put them at risk for contact 
with mosquitoes.
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On June 2, this report was posted as an MMWR 
Early Release on the MMWR website (http://www.
cdc.gov/mmwr). 
Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) is an uncommon 
peripheral neuropathy causing paralysis and in severe 
cases respiratory failure and death. GBS often follows 
an antecedent gastrointestinal or upper respiratory 
illness but, in rare cases, can follow vaccination. 
In 1976, vaccination against a novel swine-origin 
influenza A (H1N1) virus was associated with a 
statistically significant increased risk for GBS in the 
42 days after vaccination (approximately 10 excess 
cases per 1 million vaccinations), a consideration in 
halting the vaccination program in the context of 
limited influenza virus transmission (1). To monitor 
influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine safety, 
several federal surveillance systems, including CDC’s 
Emerging Infections Program (EIP), are being used. 
In October 2009, EIP began active surveillance to 
assess the risk for GBS after 2009 H1N1 vaccina-
tion. Preliminary results from an analysis in EIP 
comparing GBS patients hospitalized through March 
31, 2010, who did and did not receive 2009 H1N1 
vaccination showed an estimated age-adjusted rate 
ratio of 1.77 (GBS incidence of 1.92 per 100,000 
person-years among vaccinated persons and 1.21 per 
100,000 person-years among unvaccinated persons). 
If end-of-surveillance analysis confirms this finding, 
this would correspond to 0.8 excess cases of GBS 
per 1 million vaccinations, similar to that found in 
seasonal influenza vaccines (2,3). No other federal 
system to date has detected a statistically significant 
association between GBS and 2009 H1N1 vaccina-
tion. Surveillance and further analyses are ongoing. 
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine safety profile is similar to 
that for seasonal influenza vaccines, which have an 
excellent safety record. Vaccination remains the most 
effective method to prevent serious illness and death 
from 2009 H1N1 influenza infection; illness from 
the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus has been associated 
with a hospitalization rate of 222 per 1 million and a 
death rate of 9.7 per 1 million population.
In addition to existing surveillance systems that 
routinely monitor vaccine safety in U.S. vaccine 
recipients, new systems were added in the fall of 2009.* 
The 2009–10 influenza vaccine safety network con-
sists of the following systems: Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS), Real Time Immunization 
Monitoring Systems (RTIMS), Vaccine Safety Datalink 
(VSD), Department of Defense (DoD) Defense 
Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), Post-Licensure 
Rapid Immunization Safety Monitoring (PRISM), 
Indian Health Service (IHS), Department of Veteran 
Affairs (VA), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS), and CDC’s EIP. This report discusses 
preliminary analyses from EIP.
EIP, an established collaboration among CDC, 
state health departments, and academic centers in 10 
states, initiated a population-based, active surveillance 
program designed to provide rapid case identification 
and assessment of risk for GBS following 2009 H1N1 
vaccination.† EIP has covered approximately 45 mil-
lion residents in 10 specifically defined catchment 
areas of the United States (the states of Connecticut, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Tennessee, 
the state of New York excluding Manhattan, and 
selected metropolitan counties in California, 
Colorado, Georgia, and Oregon). Cases of GBS 
with hospital admission after September 30, 2009, 
were actively sought through newly established, 
predominantly neurologist networks and review of 
hospital administrative discharge data (ICD-9 code 
357.0) for all catchment hospitals (nearly all GBS 
patients are hospitalized). Trained surveillance officers 
reviewed medical charts to confirm the diagnosis and 
obtain data on antecedent illnesses, vaccinations, and 
clinical outcomes; primary-care physicians provided 
further details about vaccination status when possible. 
Potential cases were classified by surveillance officers, 
sometimes in consultation with neurologists, using the 
Brighton Collaboration case criteria for GBS.§ Cases 
meeting Brighton Levels 1 and 2 were considered 
Preliminary Results: Surveillance for Guillain-Barré Syndrome 
After Receipt of Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccine — 
United States, 2009–2010
* Information available at http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/
monitor_immunization_safety.html.
† Information available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncpdcid/deiss/eip/
index.html.
§ Case definitions and guidelines available at http://www.
brightoncollaboration.org/internet/en/index.html.
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confirmed GBS cases, and cases that met Brighton 
Level 3 were considered probable. Each patient 
meeting Brighton Levels 1, 2, or 3 was contacted for 
a telephone interview to gather further information 
about medical and vaccination history. 
GBS incidence was calculated and compared 
for the vaccinated and unvaccinated populations, 
which were estimated by age group, using data from 
CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS) and National 2009 H1N1 Flu Survey 
(NHFS) telephone survey data for the counties in 
the EIP catchment areas, using methods published 
previously (4). The total person-time of follow-up 
was calculated by multiplying the population under 
surveillance by the number of days since the start of 
surveillance, October 1, 2009. Person-time at risk 
for GBS in the vaccinated population was calculated 
by multiplying the number of vaccinees by 42 days 
(or the number of days from vaccination to the end 
of the surveillance period if <42 days) (1). Children 
aged 6 months–9 years who received a second dose of 
2009 H1N1 vaccine were presumed to have received 
it 28 days after the first dose, as recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices,¶ 
giving them an additional 28 days of person-time at 
risk. To calculate the corresponding person-time in 
the unvaccinated population, the person time at risk 
for GBS was summed among the vaccinated popula-
tion and then subtracted from the total person-time 
of follow-up under surveillance.
Incidence among the vaccinated population was 
calculated by dividing the number of GBS cases vac-
cinated within the risk window by the total amount 
of person-time at risk following vaccination. Incidence 
among the unvaccinated population was calculated by 
dividing the number of GBS cases unexposed to vac-
cine or exposed to vaccine outside the risk window by 
the total amount of person-time unexposed to 2009 
H1N1 vaccine. Bootstrapping methods were used 
to estimate 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the 
rate ratios that incorporated the variance of vaccine 
coverage estimates (5). A Poisson distribution was 
assumed for the occurrence of cases and a normal 
distribution for the vaccine coverage estimates; the 
Mantel-Haenszel method was used for age-adjusted 
CIs. A temporal scan statistic was used to assess for 
any significant clustering in the interval between vac-
cination and illness onset in vaccinated cases (6). 
During October 1, 2009–May 10, 2010, a total of 
529 reports of potential GBS were identified by EIP, of 
which 326 met the GBS case criteria. Of the 326 per-
sons with GBS, 27 had documentation of 2009 H1N1 
vaccination in the 42 days preceding illness onset, 274 
did not receive vaccine, and the vaccine status of 25 was 
either unknown (six) or pending ascertainment (19) 
(Table 1). Sixteen of the 27 (59%) with documentation 
of 2009 H1N1 vaccination also reported antecedent 
illness symptoms in the 42 days before GBS onset; 
78% of unvaccinated persons with GBS (215 of 274) 
reported antecedent symptoms (p=0.04). No clustering 
among vaccinated persons was observed in the period 
between vaccination and illness onset (p=0.54). Among 
the 27 GBS patients with 2009 H1N1 vaccination, 
four required ventilator support, and one remained 
hospitalized 30 days after GBS onset; among the 274 
GBS patients who did not receive 2009 H1N1 vac-
cination, 37 (14%) required ventilator support, and 
34 (12%) remained hospitalized after 30 days. Eight 
(2%) of the 326 GBS patients died (from any cause); 
none of the eight had received the 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
within 42 days of illness onset. 
Among patients hospitalized through March 
31, 2010, comparison of the incidence of GBS 
among those who received 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
and those who did not receive the vaccine revealed 
an age-adjusted rate ratio of 1.77 (CI = 1.12–2.56) 
(Table 2). If this preliminary rate ratio is confirmed 
in end-of-surveillance analyses, the attributable rate 
of GBS would be 0.71 per 100,000 person-years, cor-
responding to an attributable risk of 0.8 excess cases 
of GBS per 1 million vaccinations.** 
Reported by
C Prothro, MPH, California Emerging Infections Program, 
Oakland California. Kudish K, DVM, Connecticut Dept of 
Public Health. M Fiellin, MPH, J Meek, MPH, Connecticut 
Emerging Infections Program, New Haven, Connecticut. 
N Tellman, MPH, Georgia Emerging Infections Program, 
Atlanta, Georgia. M Milewski, MPH, B Hogan, MPH, 
Emerging Infections Program, Maryland Dept of Health 
and Mental Hygiene. C Holtzman, MPH, R Danila, PhD, 
L Dunning, MPH, R Lynfield, MD, Minnesota Dept 
of Public Health. K Scherzinger, MS, W Connor, MD, 
J Baumbach, MD, Emerging Infections Program, New 
Mexico. GP Giambrone, MS, SM Zansky, PhD, PF Smith, 
MD, Emerging Infections Program, New York State Dept 
¶ Recommendations available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5839a3.htm.
 ** The number of excess cases per 1 million vaccinations was calculated 
as the number of excess cases (i.e., attributable rate multiplied by 
person time-at-risk among the vaccinated population) divided by 
the number of vaccinations administered.
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of Health. MD, A Thomas, MD, Oregon Public Health 
Div. E Mosites, MPH, D Kirschke, MD, Tennessee Dept of 
Public Health. M Viray, MD, P Lewis, MSPH, J Sejvar, 
MD, A Baughman PhD, C Vellozzi, MD, S Fridkin, MD, 
Div of Healthcare Quality Promotion, S Conner, MPH, 
O Morgan, PhD, Div of Preparedness and Emerging Infection, 
National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control 
of Infectious Diseases; P Lu, MD, PhD, C Furlow, PhD, 
JA Singleton, MS, Immunization Service Div, National 
Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases; CR Hale, 
DVM, J Kattan, MD, R Murphree, PhD, JY Oh, MD, 
M Wise, PhD, EIS officers, CDC.
Editorial Note
This preliminary analysis showed an elevated, sta-
tistically significant association between 2009 H1N1 
vaccination and GBS. If confirmed, the excess risk for 
GBS associated with 2009 H1N1 vaccine of 0.8 cases 
per 1 million vaccinations would be comparable to the 
excess described previously for some trivalent seasonal 
influenza vaccine formulations (approximately one 
excess case per 1 million vaccinations) (2,3), and much 
smaller than the risk for GBS observed during the 1976 
swine influenza vaccine campaign (approximately 10 
excess cases per 1 million vaccinations) (1). Notably, 
the high proportion of antecedent illnesses associated 
with GBS (e.g., gastrointestinal illness or respiratory 
infection) suggests that a number of the GBS illnesses 
observed after vaccination might be attributable to 
other antecedent illness; historically, 40%–70% of 
GBS patients report experiencing an antecedent infec-
tious illness (7). Also, data demonstrating an associa-
tion between GBS and the 1976 swine flu vaccines 
described a clustering of cases during the second and 
third weeks following vaccination (1). Similarly, a single 
study of seasonal influenza vaccine and GBS risk using 
TABLE 2. Preliminary incidence rates* and rate ratios for persons with confirmed or probable Guillain-Barré syndrome, by 2009 H1N1 vaccination 









No. Person-years Rate No. Person-years Rate
≤24 32.5% 6 643,310 0.93 37 6,801,172 0.54 1.71 (0.40–3.61)
≥25 23.0% 21 763,496 2.75 216 14,024,546 1.54 1.79 (1.08–2.68)
Total 26.1% 27 1,406,806 1.92 253 20,825,718 1.21 1.77 (1.12–2.56)**
 * Per 100,000 person-years.
 † Hospitalization as of March 31, 2010, reported as of May 10, 2010.
 § Vaccination coverage for persons with reported vaccination during October 2009–March 2010 who were interviewed during November 2009–April 24, 2010 
(National 2009 H1N1 Flu Survey [NHFS]) or November 2009–April 25, 2010 (Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System [BRFSS]), using combined estimates from 
BRFSS and NHFS  with  Kaplan-Meier survival analysis procedure. Included in person-year estimates were second doses (22.9%, 95% CI = 18.7–27.1) for children 
aged 6 months–9 years.
 ¶ Confidence interval.
 ** Age adjusted total rate ratio and 95% CI.
TABLE 1. Preliminary data regarding 2009 H1N1 vaccination status of persons with confirmed or probable Guillain-Barré 
syndrome, by case status, age group, and sex — Emerging Infections Program, United States, October 1, 2009–May 10, 
2010*
Characteristic
Documented receipt of monovalent 2009 H1N1 vaccine in the 
42 days preceding illness onset
TotalYes No
Unknown or under 
investigation
No. (%) No.  (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Case status
Confirmed (Brighton Level 1 and 2) 25 (93) 224 (82) 22 (88) 271 (83)
Probable (Brighton Level 3) 2 (7) 50 (18) 3 (12) 22 (17)
Age group (yrs)
≤24 6 (22) 40 (15) 5 (20) 51 (16)
25–49 9 (33) 84 (31) 3 (12) 96 (29)
50–64 7 (26) 81 (30) 7 (28) 95 (29)
≥65 5 (19) 69 (25) 10 (40) 84 (26)
Sex
Male 15 (56) 146 (53) 13 (52) 174 (53)
Female 12 (44) 128 (47) 12 (48) 152 (47)
Total 27 (100) 274 (100) 25 (100) 326 (100)
* Reported by May 10, 2010.
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combined data from 1992–93 and 1993–94 seasonal 
influenza vaccine formulations showed GBS cases 
peaked at 2 weeks following vaccination (2), whereas 
the EIP data did not demonstrate this same clustering 
effect for the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.
Safety monitoring is an integral part of any vac-
cination program. The federal government is using 
several other systems to monitor 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
safety, including programs to detect potential associa-
tions between GBS and the vaccine. These systems 
differ in the size of the population under surveil-
lance, methods to identify and verify GBS cases, and 
methods to determine the vaccine status of persons 
with and without GBS. Interpreted collectively, these 
systems provide a comprehensive picture of vaccine 
safety. Preliminary safety data from VAERS (8) indi-
cate that the safety profile of 2009 H1N1 vaccines 
is similar to the profile for seasonal influenza vac-
cines, which have an excellent safety record. To date, 
VSD, PRISM, DoD/DMSS, VA, and CMS have 
not detected any statistically significant associations 
between GBS and receipt of influenza A (H1N1) 
2009 monovalent vaccine, although some of these sys-
tems (DoD, VA, VSD) have found a non-significant 
but slightly elevated relative risk (C. Vellozzi, CDC, 
personal communication, 2010).††
The findings in this preliminary report are subject 
to at least five limitations. First, misclassification 
of some cases might have occurred, particularly in 
younger patients where the diagnosis of GBS can be 
difficult, which might result in an underestimate of 
GBS cases; however, such an underestimate could bias 
the rate ratio in either direction. Second, some inac-
curate reporting of the date of vaccination might have 
occurred, potentially resulting in an overestimate or 
underestimate of cases within the risk window. Third, 
the rate ratio relies on vaccination coverage estimates 
using BFRSS and NHFS data; based on work from 
previous seasons studying seasonal influenza vaccine, 
2009 H1N1 vaccination coverage estimates might be 
overestimated by as much as two or three percentage 
points (9), which might produce an underestimate of 
the rate ratio. Fourth, incomplete case ascertainment 
or reporting bias might have occurred. However, these 
likely would have had a minimal effect because active 
case finding was conducted throughout the surveil-
lance period. Finally, none of the vaccine monitoring 
systems currently in use, including EIP, can fully 
account for other confounding risk factors for GBS 
that might not be measured or accounted for but 
might be associated with vaccination decisions by 
patients or providers; thus, the association described 
above cannot prove a causal relationship between 
vaccination and GBS. 
Further data collection and analyses of informa-
tion from EIP and other surveillance systems are 
ongoing; a final analysis of the EIP data, including 
a self-controlled case series (10) that can control for 
some of the confounding that might exist when com-
paring vaccinated to unvaccinated persons, is expected 
to be available in early fall 2010. Persons with a history 
of GBS should discuss potential risks and benefits 
with their health-care providers before receiving any 
influenza vaccine. However, risk assessment should 
take into account that influenza and influenza-like 
illnesses are associated with significant morbidity and 
mortality, including a hospitalization rate of 222 per 
1 million population and a death rate of 9.7 per 1 mil-
lion population for H1N1-associated illness, as well 
as  possible increased risk for GBS (11).§§ Vaccination 
remains the most effective method to prevent serious 
illness and death from influenza infection.
What is known on this topic?
Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) is an uncommon 
peripheral nerve disorder that, in rare cases, can 
follow vaccination; theoretic concern existed that an 
increased risk for GBS might occur after vaccination 
against 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1).
What is added by this report?
Preliminary findings from population-based, active 
surveillance for GBS in CDC’s Emerging Infections 
Program indicate that, if confirmed by end-of-surveil-
lance analysis, the rate of GBS following 2009 H1N1 
vaccination receipt is less than one excess GBS case 
per 1 million vaccinations, similar to the rate following 
receipt of some formulations of seasonal influenza 
vaccines. 
What are the implications for public health practice?
The incidence of GBS following 2009 H1N1 vaccina-
tion is very low, and the benefits of getting influenza 
vaccines outweigh the risk for GBS; vaccination 
remains the most important step in preventing seri-
ous illness and death from 2009 H1N1 influenza.
 †† Additional information available at http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/
nvac/reports/index.html.
 §§ Information available at http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/hosp_
deaths_ahdra.htm.
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TABLE I. Provisional cases of infrequently reported notifiable diseases (<1,000 cases reported during the preceding year) — United States, week ending 









Total cases reported 
for previous years States reporting cases 
during current week (No.)2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Anthrax — — — 1 — 1 1 —
Botulism, total 3 26 3 116 145 144 165 135
 foodborne — 3 0 11 17 32 20 19
 infant 1 19 2 80 109 85 97 85 TX (1)
 other (wound and unspecified) 2 4 0 25 19 27 48 31 CA (2)
Brucellosis 2 34 2 115 80 131 121 120 FL (1), CA (1)
Chancroid 1 26 0 33 25 23 33 17 MA (1)
Cholera — 2 0 9 5 7 9 8
Cyclosporiasis§ 1 28 17 141 139 93 137 543 FL (1)
Diphtheria — — — — — — — —
Domestic arboviral diseases § ,¶:
 California serogroup virus disease — — 0 55 62 55 67 80
 Eastern equine encephalitis virus disease — — — 4 4 4 8 21
 Powassan virus disease — — 0 6 2 7 1 1
 St. Louis encephalitis virus disease — — 0 12 13 9 10 13
 Western equine encephalitis virus disease — — — — — — — —
Haemophilus influenzae,** invasive disease (age <5 yrs):
 serotype b — 7 0 35 30 22 29 9
 nonserotype b — 67 4 236 244 199 175 135
 unknown serotype 4 95 4 178 163 180 179 217 NY (1), NE (1), GA (2)
Hansen disease§ — 15 2 79 80 101 66 87
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome§ — 2 1 14 18 32 40 26
Hemolytic uremic syndrome, postdiarrheal§ 2 42 5 241 330 292 288 221 MO (1), OK (1)
HIV infection, pediatric (age <13 yrs)†† — — 1 — — — — 380
Influenza-associated pediatric mortality§,§§ 1 52 2 360 90 77 43 45 CT (1)
Listeriosis 5 197 10 852 759 808 884 896 NY (1), OH (1), MD (1), FL (2)
Measles¶¶ 1 23 3 67 140 43 55 66 MN (1)
Meningococcal disease, invasive***:
 A, C, Y, and W-135 — 102 6 301 330 325 318 297
 serogroup B 1 44 3 174 188 167 193 156 NY (1)
 other serogroup — 6 1 23 38 35 32 27
 unknown serogroup 7 170 13 482 616 550 651 765 OH (1), MO (1), MD (1), TN (1), ID (1), OR (1), CA (1)
Mumps 7 1,480 61 2,067 454 800 6,584 314 NY (3), NE (1), TX (2), CA (1)
Novel influenza A virus infections††† — — 0 43,771 2 4 NN NN
Plague — — 0 8 3 7 17 8
Poliomyelitis, paralytic — — — — — — — 1
Polio virus Infection, nonparalytic§ — — — — — — NN NN
Psittacosis§ — 4 0 9 8 12 21 16
Q fever, total§,§§§ 1 28 4 109 120 171 169 136
 acute 1 21 2 89 106 — — — PA (1)
 chronic — 7 0 20 14 — — —
Rabies, human — — — 3 2 1 3 2
Rubella¶¶¶ — 2 0 3 16 12 11 11
Rubella, congenital syndrome — — 0 1 — — 1 1
SARS-CoV§,**** — — — — — — — —
Smallpox§ — — — — — — — —
Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome§ 5 72 3 162 157 132 125 129 CT (3), OH (2)
Syphilis, congenital (age <1 yr)†††† — 60 7 423 431 430 349 329
Tetanus — — 0 18 19 28 41 27
Toxic-shock syndrome (staphylococcal)§ 1 34 2 74 71 92 101 90 CA (1)
Trichinellosis — 1 0 12 39 5 15 16
Tularemia — 8 3 93 123 137 95 154
Typhoid fever 3 134 7 399 449 434 353 324 FL (1), CA (2)
Vancomycin-intermediate Staphylococcus aureus§ — 27 1 77 63 37 6 2
Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus§ — 1 — — — 2 1 3
Vibriosis (noncholera Vibrio species infections)§ 8 86 5 790 588 549 NN NN VA (1), FL (5), TN (1), CA (1)
Viral hemorrhagic fever§§§§ — 1 — NN NN NN NN NN
Yellow fever — — — — — — — —
See Table I footnotes on next page.
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Notifiable Disease Data Team and 122 Cities Mortality Data Team
 Patsy A. Hall-Baker
Deborah A. Adams  Rosaline Dhara
Willie J. Anderson  Pearl C. Sharp
Jose Aponte  Michael S. Wodajo
Lenee Blanton
* Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the 
past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week 
totals.
FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week 


























TABLE I. (Continued) Provisional cases of infrequently reported notifiable diseases (<1,000 cases reported during the preceding year) — United States, week 
ending May 29, 2010 (21st week)*
—: No reported cases. N: Not reportable. NN: Not Nationally Notifiable Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.
 * Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional, whereas data for 2005 through 2008 are finalized.
 † Calculated by summing the incidence counts for the current week, the 2 weeks preceding the current week, and the 2 weeks following the current week, for a total of 5 preceding years. 
Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/5yearweeklyaverage.pdf.
 § Not reportable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not reportable are excluded from this table, except starting in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenza-
associated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/infdis.htm.
 ¶ Includes both neuroinvasive and nonneuroinvasive. Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for West Nile virus are available in Table II.
 ** Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II.
 †† Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention. Implementation of HIV reporting influences 
the number of cases reported. Updates of pediatric HIV data have been temporarily suspended until upgrading of the national HIV/AIDS surveillance data management system is 
completed. Data for HIV/AIDS, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
 §§ Updated weekly from reports to the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. Since April 26, 2009, a total of 286 influenza-associated pediatric 
deaths associated with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection have been reported. Since August 30, 2009, a total of 277 influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring during the 
2009–10 influenza season have been reported. A total of 134 influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring during the 2008-09 influenza season have been reported.
 ¶¶ The one measles case reported for the current week was imported.
 *** Data for meningococcal disease (all serogroups) are available in Table II.
 ††† CDC discontinued reporting of individual confirmed and probable cases of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infections on July 24, 2009. CDC will report the total number of 2009 
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) hospitalizations and deaths weekly on the CDC H1N1 influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu). In addition, three cases of novel influenza A virus 
infections, unrelated to the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus, were reported to CDC during 2009.
 §§§ In 2009, Q fever acute and chronic reporting categories were recognized as a result of revisions to the Q fever case definition. Prior to that time, case counts were not differentiated with 
respect to acute and chronic Q fever cases.
 ¶¶¶ No rubella cases were reported for the current week.
 **** Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases.
 †††† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention.
 §§§§ There was one case of viral hemorrhagic fever reported during week 12. The one case report was confirmed as lassa fever. See Table II for dengue hemorrhagic fever.
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TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Reporting area
Chlamydia trachomatis infection Cryptosporidiosis
Current  
week






Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States 8,769 22,768 27,363 396,493 506,387 51 122 284 1,859 2,002
New England 745 740 1,396 14,897 16,066 2 6 32 102 140
Connecticut 148 215 736 3,541 4,638 — 0 28 28 38
Maine† — 48 75 953 1,033 2 1 4 25 14
Massachusetts 408 383 767 8,043 7,589 — 1 15 — 39
New Hampshire 66 35 99 452 847 — 2 6 21 21
Rhode Island† 87 70 130 1,433 1,469 — 0 8 8 2
Vermont† 36 23 63 475 490 — 1 9 20 26
Mid. Atlantic 2,791 3,113 4,619 67,026 63,939 6 14 38 220 237
New Jersey 278 441 624 8,724 10,171 — 0 5 — 14
New York (Upstate) 615 634 2,530 13,333 11,789 5 3 16 53 53
New York City 1,292 1,182 2,253 26,523 24,303 — 1 5 19 36
Pennsylvania 606 857 1,056 18,446 17,676 1 9 19 148 134
E.N. Central 586 3,409 4,413 42,173 83,331 9 28 73 395 488
Illinois — 1,048 1,322 146 25,458 — 3 8 54 45
Indiana — 309 602 4,822 9,501 — 4 11 58 110
Michigan 586 885 1,412 20,131 19,528 1 6 11 107 89
Ohio — 920 1,039 14,280 19,956 8 7 16 134 127
Wisconsin — 365 466 2,794 8,888 — 8 39 42 117
W.N. Central 6 1,308 1,711 22,783 28,993 2 19 59 285 272
Iowa 6 178 252 3,991 4,109 — 4 13 68 67
Kansas — 172 571 2,745 4,225 — 2 6 29 27
Minnesota — 263 337 4,927 6,019 — 5 31 94 59
Missouri — 489 638 8,613 10,641 1 3 12 48 50
Nebraska† — 93 237 1,877 2,090 1 2 9 37 27
North Dakota — 31 93 630 678 — 0 18 3 1
South Dakota — 49 82 — 1,231 — 1 10 6 41
S. Atlantic 1,901 4,324 6,098 67,030 104,226 14 20 50 350 340
Delaware 75 87 145 1,732 1,982 — 0 2 1 —
District of Columbia 148 113 178 2,091 2,893 — 0 1 2 3
Florida 658 1,402 1,669 28,824 30,458 9 8 24 142 109
Georgia 2 455 1,323 2,427 17,302 2 6 31 134 135
Maryland† — 436 1,031 7,387 9,047 — 1 3 11 19
North Carolina — 654 1,291 — 17,297 — 1 11 11 29
South Carolina† 584 521 1,331 11,007 11,359 — 1 7 15 18
Virginia† 385 600 924 12,074 12,271 3 1 7 28 22
West Virginia 49 67 137 1,488 1,617 — 0 2 6 5
E.S. Central 518 1,700 2,268 31,025 37,367 — 4 10 67 58
Alabama† — 476 629 9,083 11,023 — 1 5 21 19
Kentucky — 290 642 5,032 4,267 — 2 4 23 14
Mississippi — 429 640 6,559 9,966 — 0 3 4 5
Tennessee† 518 561 734 10,351 12,111 — 1 5 19 20
W.S. Central 552 2,949 5,784 59,003 64,682 5 8 40 102 100
Arkansas† 296 277 402 6,124 5,973 — 1 5 12 12
Louisiana — 386 1,055 2,922 12,378 — 1 6 14 11
Oklahoma 255 252 2,727 6,190 2,981 3 2 9 20 27
Texas† 1 2,041 3,232 43,767 43,350 2 5 30 56 50
Mountain 419 1,542 2,118 27,483 28,797 1 10 25 159 152
Arizona 201 489 713 9,238 10,439 — 0 3 10 13
Colorado — 429 709 6,699 4,515 — 2 10 47 36
Idaho† — 64 185 1,046 1,563 — 1 7 27 18
Montana† 13 57 78 1,210 1,328 — 1 4 21 14
Nevada† 160 171 478 3,847 4,181 — 0 2 5 7
New Mexico† — 166 453 2,213 3,337 1 2 8 25 46
Utah 45 115 175 2,490 2,615 — 1 4 17 6
Wyoming† — 34 70 740 819 — 0 2 7 12
Pacific 1,251 3,456 5,313 65,073 78,986 12 13 27 179 215
Alaska — 103 144 2,360 2,255 — 0 1 1 2
California 1,251 2,677 4,406 51,324 60,437 5 8 20 105 112
Hawaii — 112 137 2,010 2,546 — 0 0 — 1
Oregon — 176 468 1,367 4,492 3 2 10 47 76
Washington — 395 638 8,012 9,256 4 1 8 26 24
American Samoa — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 1 27 78 — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 114 329 2,125 3,038 N 0 0 N N
U.S. Virgin Islands — 9 16 132 214 — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS, and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Dengue Virus Infection
Reporting area
Dengue Fever† Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever§
Current  
week






Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States — 0 8 34 NN — 0 0 — NN
New England — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Connecticut — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Maine¶ — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Massachusetts — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New Hampshire — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Rhode Island¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Vermont¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Mid. Atlantic — 0 3 12 NN — 0 0 — NN
New Jersey — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New York (Upstate) — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New York City — 0 2 8 NN — 0 0 — NN
Pennsylvania — 0 2 4 NN — 0 0 — NN
E.N. Central — 0 2 5 NN — 0 0 — NN
Illinois — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Indiana — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Michigan — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Ohio — 0 2 5 NN — 0 0 — NN
Wisconsin — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
W.N. Central — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Iowa — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Kansas — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Minnesota — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Missouri — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Nebraska¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
North Dakota — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
South Dakota — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
S. Atlantic — 0 2 10 NN — 0 0 — NN
Delaware — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
District of Columbia — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Florida — 0 2 9 NN — 0 0 — NN
Georgia — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Maryland¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
North Carolina — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
South Carolina¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Virginia¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
West Virginia — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
E.S. Central — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Alabama¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Kentucky — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Mississippi — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Tennessee¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
W.S. Central — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Arkansas¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Louisiana — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Oklahoma — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Texas¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Mountain — 0 1 2 NN — 0 0 — NN
Arizona — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Colorado — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Idaho¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Montana¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Nevada¶ — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
New Mexico¶ — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Utah — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Wyoming¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Pacific — 0 2 3 NN — 0 0 — NN
Alaska — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
California — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Hawaii — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Oregon — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Washington — 0 2 2 NN — 0 0 — NN
American Samoa — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
C.N.M.I. — — — — NN — — — — NN
Guam — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Puerto Rico — 0 82 795 NN — 0 3 19 NN
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Dengue Fever includes cases that meet criteria for Dengue Fever with hemorrhage.
§ DHF includes cases that meet criteria for dengue shock syndrome (DSS), a more severe form of DHF.
¶ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Ehrlichiosis/Anaplasmosis†
Reporting area
Ehrlichia chaffeensis Anaplasma phagocytophilum Undetermined
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 5 10 153 62 122 3 13 302 23 114 — 2 37 6 41
New England — 0 4 2 4 1 1 21 7 24 — 0 1 — 1
Connecticut — 0 0 — — — 0 13 — — — 0 0 — —
Maine§ — 0 1 2 — 1 0 3 4 4 — 0 0 — —
Massachusetts — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
New Hampshire — 0 1 — — — 0 3 1 6 — 0 1 — —
Rhode Island§ — 0 4 — 4 — 0 20 2 14 — 0 0 — 1
Vermont§ — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic 1 3 15 9 25 2 4 27 9 36 — 0 4 1 11
New Jersey — 1 8 — 15 — 0 7 — 12 — 0 0 — —
New York (Upstate) 1 1 15 5 5 2 2 20 9 23 — 0 2 1 1
New York City — 0 2 3 1 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 1 — 1
Pennsylvania — 0 5 1 4 — 0 1 — — — 0 3 — 9
E.N. Central — 0 8 — 24 — 2 23 1 51 — 0 7 1 16
Illinois — 0 4 — 9 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 1 — 2
Indiana — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 3 1 10
Michigan — 0 1 — 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Ohio — 0 2 — 2 — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 — —
Wisconsin — 0 3 — 12 — 2 22 1 49 — 0 4 — 4
W.N. Central 2 2 23 13 19 — 0 261 — — — 0 30 2 4
Iowa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Kansas — 0 2 — 2 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Minnesota — 0 6 — — — 0 261 — — — 0 30 — 2
Missouri 2 1 22 13 17 — 0 2 — — — 0 4 2 2
Nebraska§ — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
North Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
South Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic 2 3 14 25 30 — 0 2 6 2 — 0 2 — —
Delaware — 0 2 4 4 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Florida — 0 1 2 3 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Georgia — 0 2 3 7 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Maryland§ — 0 4 4 11 — 0 1 2 2 — 0 0 — —
North Carolina — 0 3 7 — — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
South Carolina§ — 0 1 — 2 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ 2 1 13 5 3 — 0 1 1 — — 0 2 — —
West Virginia — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
E.S. Central — 1 11 7 17 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 5 2 9
Alabama§ — 0 3 1 — — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Kentucky — 0 2 1 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mississippi — 0 2 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Tennessee§ — 1 10 5 16 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 5 2 9
W.S. Central — 0 118 6 1 — 0 17 — — — 0 3 — —
Arkansas§ — 0 11 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 3 — —
Louisiana — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oklahoma — 0 105 5 1 — 0 16 — — — 0 0 — —
Texas§ — 0 2 1 — — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Mountain — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Arizona — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Colorado — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Idaho§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Montana§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Nevada§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
New Mexico§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Utah — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Wyoming§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Pacific — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Alaska — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
California — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Hawaii — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oregon — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Cumulative total E. ewingii cases reported as of this week = 0.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Reporting area
Giardiasis Gonorrhea
Haemophilus influenzae, invasive†  
All ages, all serotypes
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 183 343 661 5,888 6,343 1,980 5,463 6,935 88,417 121,236 22 55 171 1,120 1,301
New England — 26 65 292 511 85 92 197 1,999 1,913 3 3 21 32 82
Connecticut — 6 15 94 98 24 45 170 917 879 3 0 15 15 23
Maine§ — 4 13 72 73 — 3 11 80 58 — 0 2 3 12
Massachusetts — 9 36 — 220 41 39 81 801 781 — 0 8 — 39
New Hampshire — 3 11 47 46 3 2 7 66 44 — 0 2 7 4
Rhode Island§ — 1 7 19 23 — 6 19 108 128 — 0 2 4 1
Vermont§ — 4 14 60 51 17 0 5 27 23 — 0 1 3 3
Mid. Atlantic 31 61 112 984 1,213 585 627 941 13,040 12,229 7 12 34 255 227
New Jersey — 6 15 2 173 77 91 132 1,793 1,883 — 2 7 32 39
New York (Upstate) 18 24 84 409 423 93 101 422 2,073 2,122 4 3 20 71 52
New York City 7 16 25 312 342 273 215 396 4,787 4,384 3 2 6 56 30
Pennsylvania 6 15 37 261 275 142 206 277 4,387 3,840 — 4 9 96 106
E.N. Central 21 49 92 868 994 178 1,070 1,536 11,881 26,254 1 8 18 151 213
Illinois — 12 22 175 209 — 349 441 48 8,399 — 3 9 45 77
Indiana — 6 14 73 85 — 91 183 1,336 3,107 — 1 5 28 42
Michigan 2 13 25 231 248 178 246 502 5,617 6,303 — 0 4 14 12
Ohio 19 16 28 340 308 — 311 359 4,307 6,227 1 2 6 51 47
Wisconsin — 7 23 49 144 — 90 115 573 2,218 — 1 5 13 35
W.N. Central 9 27 165 541 548 1 271 367 4,490 6,046 3 2 24 73 71
Iowa 2 6 15 102 99 1 31 46 618 697 — 0 1 1 —
Kansas — 3 14 76 52 — 40 83 537 1,016 — 0 2 7 10
Minnesota — 0 135 136 137 — 41 64 736 951 — 0 17 22 15
Missouri 5 9 27 138 173 — 123 172 2,138 2,635 1 1 6 31 31
Nebraska§ 2 3 9 74 55 — 22 55 418 544 2 0 3 7 12
North Dakota — 0 8 9 4 — 2 11 43 46 — 0 4 5 3
South Dakota — 1 10 6 28 — 4 16 — 157 — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic 79 72 144 1,485 1,376 536 1,315 1,774 18,485 30,304 7 14 27 287 366
Delaware 1 0 3 11 12 17 19 37 403 340 — 0 1 3 3
District of Columbia — 1 4 10 26 53 43 86 768 1,152 — 0 1 — 1
Florida 52 37 87 740 719 194 381 482 7,613 8,695 2 3 10 86 119
Georgia 9 13 52 365 288 — 146 494 851 5,751 4 3 9 77 70
Maryland§ 10 5 12 124 104 — 125 237 2,027 2,366 — 1 6 19 43
North Carolina N 0 0 N N — 226 386 — 5,719 — 1 6 20 48
South Carolina§ — 2 7 40 40 174 159 394 3,246 3,342 1 2 7 43 32
Virginia§ 7 8 37 182 170 90 164 271 3,385 2,705 — 2 5 31 34
West Virginia — 1 5 13 17 8 8 19 192 234 — 0 5 8 16
E.S. Central 1 7 22 96 139 150 482 655 8,516 10,648 — 3 12 77 80
Alabama§ — 4 13 52 66 — 138 187 2,787 3,098 — 0 2 7 23
Kentucky N 0 0 N N — 84 156 1,279 1,265 — 0 5 14 7
Mississippi N 0 0 N N — 127 198 1,786 3,025 — 0 2 6 6
Tennessee§ 1 3 18 44 73 150 144 206 2,664 3,260 — 2 10 50 44
W.S. Central 1 9 18 117 146 168 872 1,554 15,557 18,635 1 2 20 56 59
Arkansas§ — 2 9 32 43 93 88 139 1,746 1,798 — 0 3 7 10
Louisiana — 3 10 44 71 — 120 343 910 4,005 — 0 2 12 10
Oklahoma 1 3 10 41 32 75 76 616 1,621 1,037 1 1 15 32 36
Texas§ N 0 0 N N — 565 965 11,280 11,795 — 0 2 5 3
Mountain 1 31 64 540 510 52 173 266 3,098 3,577 — 5 14 144 127
Arizona — 3 7 50 80 28 63 109 1,067 1,134 — 2 10 55 42
Colorado — 12 26 258 146 — 50 127 888 1,073 — 1 6 37 37
Idaho§ — 4 10 78 47 — 2 8 28 41 — 0 2 6 2
Montana§ 1 3 11 48 41 — 2 6 44 37 — 0 1 1 1
Nevada§ — 2 11 23 34 22 27 94 702 753 — 0 2 5 10
New Mexico§ — 1 8 25 45 — 19 41 238 388 — 1 5 22 18
Utah — 5 13 43 94 2 6 14 120 125 — 1 4 13 16
Wyoming§ — 1 5 15 23 — 1 7 11 26 — 0 2 5 1
Pacific 40 54 132 965 906 225 545 653 11,351 11,630 — 2 9 45 76
Alaska — 2 7 34 24 — 22 36 559 371 — 0 2 11 7
California 30 34 61 604 645 225 452 546 9,489 9,521 — 0 3 1 28
Hawaii — 0 2 — 7 — 10 24 230 268 — 0 2 — 15
Oregon 3 9 17 191 126 — 14 43 106 472 — 1 5 30 23
Washington 7 9 75 136 104 — 43 84 967 998 — 0 4 3 3
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 1 1 — — 0 3 5 — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 1 10 9 60 — 4 24 97 87 — 0 1 1 2
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 1 6 25 68 — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Data for H. influenzae (age <5 yrs for serotype b, nonserotype b, and unknown serotype) are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*

















Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 13 33 68 523 786 26 56 203 1,011 1,371 7 15 43 288 309
New England — 1 5 19 43 — 1 4 19 26 — 1 5 9 22
Connecticut — 0 2 12 9 — 0 3 5 5 — 1 4 9 17
Maine† — 0 1 3 1 — 0 2 8 6 — 0 1 — —
Massachusetts — 1 4 — 23 — 0 2 — 12 — 0 1 — 4
New Hampshire — 0 1 — 5 — 0 2 5 3 — 0 0 — —
Rhode Island† — 0 4 4 3 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Vermont† — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — 1
Mid. Atlantic 3 4 10 76 103 3 5 10 116 164 1 2 4 37 39
New Jersey — 1 5 8 34 — 1 4 24 55 — 0 2 4 6
New York (Upstate) 3 1 3 24 18 2 1 6 22 28 1 1 3 22 18
New York City — 2 5 24 25 — 1 4 35 30 — 0 1 — 1
Pennsylvania — 1 6 20 26 1 1 5 35 51 — 0 3 11 14
E.N. Central — 4 19 65 121 1 7 14 132 198 — 2 5 50 38
Illinois — 1 13 13 44 — 2 6 23 44 — 0 1 — 3
Indiana — 0 4 8 9 — 1 5 19 37 — 0 3 8 5
Michigan — 1 4 25 31 — 2 6 44 55 — 1 5 40 12
Ohio — 0 4 14 23 1 2 4 46 53 — 0 3 2 16
Wisconsin — 0 2 5 14 — 0 3 — 9 — 0 1 — 2
W.N. Central 1 1 10 22 50 1 3 15 53 50 — 0 11 13 4
Iowa — 0 3 4 15 — 1 3 9 10 — 0 4 1 2
Kansas — 0 2 6 5 — 0 2 2 4 — 0 0 — 1
Minnesota — 0 8 1 12 — 0 13 2 10 — 0 9 3 —
Missouri 1 0 3 10 8 1 1 5 32 16 — 0 1 7 —
Nebraska† — 0 3 1 8 — 0 2 8 9 — 0 1 1 1
North Dakota — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
South Dakota — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 1 1 —
S. Atlantic 2 7 14 121 180 12 16 39 310 375 2 3 8 63 89
Delaware — 0 1 5 2 — 1 2 12 15 U 0 0 U U
District of Columbia — 0 1 1 1 — 0 2 2 4 — 0 1 2 —
Florida 2 3 8 46 84 11 5 11 128 128 — 1 4 22 13
Georgia — 1 3 16 15 1 3 7 61 58 1 0 2 5 20
Maryland† — 0 4 10 18 — 1 6 23 42 1 1 3 13 17
North Carolina — 0 3 11 31 — 1 4 4 54 — 0 4 9 17
South Carolina† — 1 4 18 16 — 1 4 15 18 — 0 0 — 1
Virginia† — 1 3 13 13 — 2 14 40 35 — 0 2 6 6
West Virginia — 0 2 1 — — 0 19 25 21 — 0 3 6 15
E.S. Central 1 1 3 17 15 — 6 13 105 149 1 2 6 50 44
Alabama† — 0 2 4 3 — 1 5 24 45 1 0 2 2 5
Kentucky — 0 2 9 2 — 2 6 34 36 — 1 5 36 24
Mississippi — 0 1 — 5 — 0 3 8 10 — 0 0 — —
Tennessee† 1 0 2 4 5 — 2 6 39 58 — 0 3 12 15
W.S. Central 4 3 19 56 71 6 10 109 138 222 2 1 14 22 18
Arkansas† — 0 3 — 5 — 0 4 3 23 — 0 1 — 1
Louisiana — 0 1 3 2 — 1 5 16 23 — 0 1 2 4
Oklahoma — 0 3 — 1 4 1 19 29 45 2 0 12 11 2
Texas† 4 3 18 53 63 2 5 87 90 131 — 0 4 9 11
Mountain — 3 8 57 54 — 2 6 34 54 — 1 4 17 24
Arizona — 1 5 31 20 — 0 3 11 23 — 0 0 — —
Colorado — 1 4 9 16 — 0 2 1 11 — 0 3 2 13
Idaho† — 0 1 3 — — 0 2 4 2 — 0 2 6 1
Montana† — 0 1 4 3 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — 1
Nevada† — 0 2 6 7 — 1 3 14 8 — 0 1 1 2
New Mexico† — 0 1 3 5 — 0 1 2 4 — 0 2 5 5
Utah — 0 2 1 3 — 0 1 2 4 — 0 1 3 2
Wyoming† — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — 2 — 0 0 — —
Pacific 2 5 16 90 149 3 6 20 104 133 1 1 6 27 31
Alaska — 0 0 — 3 — 0 1 1 2 — 0 2 — —
California — 4 15 73 109 1 4 16 73 97 — 1 4 9 15
Hawaii — 0 2 — 6 — 0 1 — 3 — 0 0 — —
Oregon — 0 2 8 8 — 1 4 15 16 — 0 3 10 8
Washington 2 0 4 9 23 2 0 4 15 15 1 0 6 8 8
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 6 10 — — 1 6 22 — — 1 5 19 —
Puerto Rico — 0 2 2 14 — 0 5 7 11 — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Reporting area
Legionellosis Lyme disease Malaria
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 37 57 174 667 692 125 426 2,342 3,819 5,869 6 26 87 379 441
New England 2 3 18 22 26 6 121 857 629 2,150 1 1 4 5 19
Connecticut 1 1 5 11 6 — 31 295 232 886 1 0 3 1 1
Maine† 1 0 3 3 — 4 14 76 145 75 — 0 1 1 1
Massachusetts — 0 9 — 18 — 42 401 — 821 — 0 3 — 12
New Hampshire — 0 3 2 — — 17 95 206 306 — 0 1 1 1
Rhode Island† — 0 4 5 1 — 1 29 10 16 — 0 1 1 2
Vermont† — 0 1 1 1 2 5 45 36 46 — 0 1 1 2
Mid. Atlantic 16 18 73 163 184 84 190 999 2,204 2,215 1 7 17 109 121
New Jersey — 3 14 3 35 — 39 430 518 893 — 1 5 1 33
New York (Upstate) 8 5 29 53 60 63 54 577 523 569 — 1 4 26 17
New York City — 3 19 34 23 — 13 58 2 188 1 3 12 59 55
Pennsylvania 8 6 25 73 66 21 66 475 1,161 565 — 1 4 23 16
E.N. Central 5 10 41 113 146 — 19 258 66 365 — 2 12 36 58
Illinois — 1 11 7 21 — 1 12 5 16 — 1 6 17 26
Indiana — 1 5 9 18 — 1 6 9 14 — 0 4 2 9
Michigan — 3 13 29 23 — 1 9 6 4 — 0 3 4 6
Ohio 5 5 17 66 63 — 1 5 5 4 — 0 6 13 14
Wisconsin — 0 6 2 21 — 18 239 41 327 — 0 2 — 3
W.N. Central 2 2 19 26 23 — 3 1,395 12 55 — 1 11 21 20
Iowa — 0 3 2 8 — 0 15 5 19 — 0 1 6 4
Kansas — 0 1 2 3 — 0 2 3 7 — 0 1 3 1
Minnesota — 0 16 9 — — 0 1,380 — 26 — 0 11 3 9
Missouri 2 1 5 9 7 — 0 1 1 1 — 0 1 3 4
Nebraska† — 0 2 2 4 — 0 3 3 1 — 0 2 6 1
North Dakota — 0 1 2 1 — 0 15 — — — 0 1 — —
South Dakota — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — 1
S. Atlantic 6 11 24 142 143 32 66 255 782 987 1 6 15 103 138
Delaware — 0 5 5 1 2 12 65 198 223 — 0 1 2 1
District of Columbia — 0 5 2 5 — 0 7 3 9 — 0 3 5 5
Florida 3 4 10 63 57 1 2 11 27 11 1 2 7 46 35
Georgia — 1 4 17 19 — 0 6 3 12 — 0 6 2 28
Maryland† 2 3 12 31 26 25 28 134 359 513 — 1 13 22 36
North Carolina — 0 5 2 20 — 1 7 12 34 — 0 3 5 15
South Carolina† — 0 2 1 2 — 1 3 10 13 — 0 1 1 1
Virginia† 1 1 6 19 13 4 13 79 155 139 — 1 5 20 16
West Virginia — 0 2 2 — — 0 33 15 33 — 0 2 — 1
E.S. Central 1 2 12 32 36 — 1 4 14 7 1 0 4 7 15
Alabama† — 0 2 3 7 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 3 1 3
Kentucky — 1 3 8 14 — 0 1 1 1 — 0 3 2 5
Mississippi — 0 2 2 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Tennessee† 1 1 9 19 14 — 1 4 13 5 1 0 1 4 7
W.S. Central 2 2 14 29 38 1 4 44 21 28 2 1 31 45 11
Arkansas† — 0 1 1 3 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 —
Louisiana — 0 3 1 5 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — 3
Oklahoma 1 0 4 4 2 — 0 2 — — — 0 1 3 —
Texas† 1 1 10 23 28 1 4 42 21 28 2 1 30 41 8
Mountain — 3 8 37 39 — 1 4 5 15 — 1 6 13 12
Arizona — 1 4 14 16 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 2 6 1
Colorado — 0 4 2 4 — 0 1 1 — — 0 3 1 9
Idaho† — 0 2 — 1 — 0 3 2 5 — 0 1 — —
Montana† — 0 1 1 4 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 3 1 —
Nevada† — 0 2 11 6 — 0 2 — 4 — 0 1 2 —
New Mexico† — 0 2 2 1 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Utah — 0 4 6 6 — 0 1 1 4 — 0 1 3 2
Wyoming† — 0 2 1 1 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Pacific 3 4 19 103 57 2 4 10 86 47 — 3 19 40 47
Alaska — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 1 2 — 0 1 2 1
California 3 3 19 94 49 2 3 9 58 27 — 2 13 28 34
Hawaii — 0 0 — 1 N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — 1
Oregon — 0 3 2 3 — 1 4 26 16 — 0 1 3 6
Washington — 0 4 7 3 — 0 3 1 2 — 0 5 7 5
American Samoa — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 1 — — N 0 0 N N — 0 2 1 1
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Reporting area
Meningococcal disease, invasive† 
All groups Pertussis Rabies, animal
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 8 16 43 322 477 157 266 1,752 3,770 5,321 53 73 147 1,002 2,074
New England — 0 2 4 16 2 7 23 32 261 7 5 24 100 125
Connecticut — 0 2 — 2 — 1 4 14 14 7 1 22 50 49
Maine§ — 0 1 1 2 2 0 10 7 37 — 1 4 25 20
Massachusetts — 0 1 — 9 — 4 12 — 167 — 0 0 — —
New Hampshire — 0 1 — 1 — 1 6 3 29 — 0 3 3 14
Rhode Island§ — 0 1 — 1 — 0 8 5 8 — 0 5 3 15
Vermont§ — 0 1 3 1 — 0 1 3 6 — 1 5 19 27
Mid. Atlantic 1 2 4 32 52 18 20 42 259 466 14 10 23 245 238
New Jersey — 0 2 8 6 — 4 10 32 103 — 0 0 — —
New York (Upstate) 1 0 3 7 11 8 5 27 103 69 14 9 22 185 136
New York City — 0 2 7 10 — 0 11 3 42 — 0 11 60 2
Pennsylvania — 1 2 10 25 10 8 22 121 252 — 0 0 — 100
E.N. Central 1 3 7 45 87 55 56 105 978 1,057 1 2 19 35 49
Illinois — 0 4 7 21 — 9 29 122 264 — 1 9 15 17
Indiana — 0 2 11 21 — 6 16 79 127 — 0 5 — 11
Michigan — 0 5 7 12 13 18 41 316 224 1 1 6 14 16
Ohio 1 1 2 17 20 42 19 49 456 382 — 0 5 6 5
Wisconsin — 0 2 3 13 — 1 12 5 60 — 0 0 — —
W.N. Central 1 1 6 23 36 11 27 627 311 916 3 6 18 81 152
Iowa — 0 3 4 4 — 4 17 102 87 — 0 4 — 13
Kansas — 0 2 1 6 — 3 12 45 89 — 1 4 22 41
Minnesota — 0 2 2 8 — 0 601 6 173 — 0 9 13 18
Missouri 1 0 3 11 13 7 12 35 118 473 2 1 5 20 15
Nebraska§ — 0 2 5 3 4 2 5 37 83 1 1 6 23 42
North Dakota — 0 1 — — — 0 12 — 2 — 0 7 3 4
South Dakota — 0 2 — 2 — 0 6 3 9 — 0 4 — 19
S. Atlantic 1 2 7 66 95 32 22 63 381 580 26 31 58 413 943
Delaware — 0 1 1 2 — 0 2 — 6 — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 0 — — — 0 1 2 3 — 0 0 — —
Florida — 1 5 35 29 28 6 29 112 196 — 0 21 43 161
Georgia — 0 1 6 17 — 3 8 71 113 — 5 14 — 180
Maryland§ 1 0 1 3 4 — 3 8 43 50 — 7 15 137 146
North Carolina — 0 2 5 24 — 1 9 — 87 — 5 17 — 198
South Carolina§ — 0 1 5 6 2 4 18 98 58 — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ — 0 2 10 9 2 4 15 48 62 22 10 26 200 216
West Virginia — 0 2 1 4 — 0 6 7 5 4 2 6 33 42
E.S. Central 1 0 4 18 17 1 15 31 285 299 — 2 7 48 73
Alabama§ — 0 2 4 4 — 4 17 66 107 — 0 4 16 —
Kentucky — 0 2 7 3 — 4 15 113 93 — 0 2 3 24
Mississippi — 0 1 2 2 — 1 6 19 29 — 0 1 — 1
Tennessee§ 1 0 2 5 8 1 4 10 87 70 — 1 6 29 48
W.S. Central — 1 9 37 39 28 69 754 1,025 930 1 9 40 11 355
Arkansas§ — 0 2 3 5 — 5 30 30 102 — 0 10 6 16
Louisiana — 0 3 8 10 — 1 7 9 76 — 0 0 — —
Oklahoma — 0 7 12 2 — 0 41 5 12 1 0 15 5 4
Texas§ — 1 7 14 22 28 61 681 981 740 — 8 30 — 335
Mountain 1 1 4 25 39 5 17 41 304 425 — 1 8 15 44
Arizona — 0 2 7 7 — 6 12 110 81 — 0 5 — —
Colorado — 0 3 6 11 — 3 13 42 111 — 0 0 — —
Idaho§ 1 0 1 4 5 5 1 19 65 41 — 0 2 1 —
Montana§ — 0 1 1 5 — 1 6 7 10 — 0 4 — 13
Nevada§ — 0 1 4 3 — 0 6 2 6 — 0 1 — —
New Mexico§ — 0 1 2 3 — 1 6 29 30 — 0 3 4 15
Utah — 0 1 1 1 — 3 7 47 129 — 0 2 — 1
Wyoming§ — 0 1 — 4 — 0 2 2 17 — 0 3 10 15
Pacific 2 3 16 72 96 5 22 186 195 387 1 4 12 54 95
Alaska — 0 2 1 3 — 0 4 11 26 — 0 2 11 16
California 1 2 13 49 62 — 11 162 27 148 1 3 11 39 79
Hawaii — 0 2 — 3 — 0 4 — 14 — 0 0 — —
Oregon 1 0 5 13 19 2 4 12 101 89 — 0 2 4 —
Washington — 0 7 9 9 3 5 24 56 110 — 0 0 — —
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — 1 — 1 3 20 20
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Data for meningococcal disease, invasive caused by serogroups A, C, Y, and W-135; serogroup B; other serogroup; and unknown serogroup are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Reporting area
Salmonellosis Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC)† Shigellosis
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 354 959 1,520 10,198 13,870 38 75 193 877 1,310 125 276 522 4,518 6,366
New England 1 22 146 271 1,107 — 2 30 32 126 — 3 28 30 114
Connecticut — 0 141 141 430 — 0 18 18 67 — 0 19 19 43
Maine§ 1 2 7 30 42 — 0 2 3 8 — 0 2 3 2
Massachusetts — 16 47 — 408 — 1 6 — 30 — 2 27 — 57
New Hampshire — 3 9 50 151 — 0 3 9 15 — 0 5 3 2
Rhode Island§ — 2 11 33 54 — 0 26 — — — 0 7 4 7
Vermont§ — 1 5 17 22 — 0 3 2 6 — 0 1 1 3
Mid. Atlantic 40 84 208 1,379 1,622 7 6 24 111 136 10 39 90 622 1,239
New Jersey — 18 47 169 337 — 1 5 8 42 — 6 23 98 309
New York (Upstate) 19 24 78 363 364 4 3 15 49 33 3 4 19 68 72
New York City 10 23 46 368 371 — 1 4 12 28 — 7 15 113 197
Pennsylvania 11 28 67 479 550 3 2 8 42 33 7 21 63 343 661
E.N. Central 39 74 168 1,081 1,812 4 9 29 106 239 17 29 233 719 1,273
Illinois — 24 52 338 519 — 1 6 10 75 — 9 227 501 312
Indiana — 10 31 36 179 — 1 9 13 25 — 1 5 13 34
Michigan 3 15 34 228 381 1 2 7 38 41 — 4 10 67 110
Ohio 36 25 52 445 495 3 2 11 39 39 17 9 46 126 610
Wisconsin — 10 30 34 238 — 2 11 6 59 — 4 23 12 207
W.N. Central 14 45 94 669 949 7 10 39 158 163 47 42 88 1,098 307
Iowa 1 7 16 102 148 — 2 14 24 38 — 0 5 18 38
Kansas — 6 20 99 117 — 1 5 12 20 — 4 14 84 95
Minnesota — 10 32 177 216 — 2 17 31 39 — 1 6 14 28
Missouri 12 13 29 217 176 7 2 28 74 38 47 36 75 972 133
Nebraska§ 1 4 12 59 176 — 1 6 16 23 — 0 3 10 10
North Dakota — 0 39 8 12 — 0 7 — 1 — 0 5 — 1
South Dakota — 1 9 7 104 — 0 12 1 4 — 0 1 — 2
S. Atlantic 137 286 503 2,888 3,146 8 12 22 167 228 28 40 73 665 928
Delaware — 2 9 29 25 — 0 2 1 5 — 3 10 31 28
District of Columbia — 2 6 23 37 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 3 11 13
Florida 73 132 277 1,390 1,324 3 3 7 64 67 14 11 19 254 175
Georgia 28 42 105 463 541 — 1 4 19 24 10 12 23 241 247
Maryland§ 18 15 32 252 249 3 1 6 25 26 1 4 17 37 151
North Carolina — 34 90 230 406 — 1 5 4 48 — 2 26 15 178
South Carolina§ 10 17 66 199 224 — 0 3 5 10 1 1 6 29 61
Virginia§ 8 18 68 239 284 2 3 13 44 39 2 3 15 46 70
West Virginia — 4 23 63 56 — 0 5 3 8 — 0 2 1 5
E.S. Central 11 48 111 569 795 — 4 10 48 74 1 11 33 200 403
Alabama§ — 14 40 159 250 — 1 4 13 15 1 2 10 28 78
Kentucky 5 7 18 120 154 — 1 4 5 23 — 3 15 85 108
Mississippi — 13 42 115 184 — 0 1 7 6 — 1 4 11 13
Tennessee§ 6 13 33 175 207 — 1 8 23 30 — 5 14 76 204
W.S. Central 51 110 546 956 1,393 1 5 68 39 89 13 47 250 707 1,224
Arkansas§ — 9 25 54 155 — 0 4 5 9 — 3 15 12 127
Louisiana — 21 46 206 287 — 0 3 4 11 — 3 7 60 94
Oklahoma 15 10 46 132 174 1 0 27 3 6 4 6 96 126 79
Texas§ 36 59 477 564 777 — 3 41 27 63 9 34 144 509 924
Mountain 1 49 133 752 1,000 1 7 26 95 141 — 15 48 178 431
Arizona — 18 50 238 349 — 1 4 21 16 — 10 42 93 298
Colorado — 11 33 193 201 — 2 11 16 64 — 2 6 28 33
Idaho§ — 3 10 45 61 1 1 7 14 14 — 0 1 5 2
Montana§ — 2 7 34 50 — 0 7 15 6 — 0 1 4 11
Nevada§ — 4 13 65 103 — 0 4 9 7 — 1 7 11 28
New Mexico§ 1 5 40 76 98 — 1 3 10 13 — 1 8 33 49
Utah — 6 14 86 114 — 1 11 9 20 — 0 4 4 10
Wyoming§ — 1 9 15 24 — 0 2 1 1 — 0 2 — —
Pacific 60 122 299 1,633 2,046 10 9 46 121 114 9 21 64 299 447
Alaska — 1 7 30 26 — 0 0 — — — 0 2 — 1
California 41 90 227 1,166 1,562 2 5 35 62 72 6 16 51 252 347
Hawaii — 4 62 — 92 — 0 2 — 3 — 0 4 — 10
Oregon 1 9 48 228 153 1 1 11 11 11 — 1 4 22 23
Washington 18 14 61 209 213 7 3 18 48 28 3 2 9 25 66
American Samoa — 1 1 1 — — 0 0 — — — 1 1 1 3
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 8 39 69 204 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — 5
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Includes E. coli O157:H7; Shiga toxin-positive, serogroup non-O157; and Shiga toxin-positive, not serogrouped.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*











Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States — 2 12 18 31 5 11 354 147 342
New England — 0 1 — — — 0 2 1 5
Connecticut — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Maine§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 4
Massachusetts — 0 1 — — — 0 2 — 1
New Hampshire — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Rhode Island§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Vermont§ — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic — 0 2 3 — — 1 7 13 28
New Jersey — 0 1 — — — 0 4 — 22
New York (Upstate) — 0 1 — — — 0 3 2 1
New York City — 0 1 — — — 0 2 7 2
Pennsylvania — 0 2 3 — — 0 2 4 3
E.N. Central — 0 1 — 3 — 0 7 — 26
Illinois — 0 1 — — — 0 6 — 15
Indiana — 0 1 — 2 — 0 2 — 2
Michigan — 0 1 — 1 — 0 1 — —
Ohio — 0 0 — — — 0 4 — 8
Wisconsin — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — 1
W.N. Central — 0 3 2 3 1 2 23 38 50
Iowa — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — 2
Kansas — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Minnesota — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Missouri — 0 1 2 1 1 2 22 38 48
Nebraska§ — 0 2 — 2 — 0 1 — —
North Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
South Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic — 1 7 9 21 2 3 31 52 139
Delaware — 0 1 1 — — 0 3 5 3
District of Columbia — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Florida — 0 1 1 — 2 0 1 5 2
Georgia — 0 6 5 19 — 0 0 — —
Maryland§ — 0 1 1 — — 0 3 3 20
North Carolina — 0 2 1 1 — 1 23 27 81
South Carolina§ — 0 1 — 1 — 0 1 2 13
Virginia§ — 0 1 — — — 0 5 10 20
West Virginia — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
E.S. Central — 0 2 3 — 2 3 16 30 68
Alabama§ — 0 1 — — — 1 7 6 11
Kentucky — 0 1 2 — — 0 0 — —
Mississippi — 0 0 — — — 0 3 — 4
Tennessee§ — 0 2 1 — 2 2 13 24 53
W.S. Central — 0 3 1 — — 1 346 12 17
Arkansas§ — 0 0 — — — 0 48 — 2
Louisiana — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — 1
Oklahoma — 0 3 — — — 0 287 8 3
Texas§ — 0 1 1 — — 0 11 4 11
Mountain — 0 2 — 3 — 0 3 1 9
Arizona — 0 2 — 1 — 0 2 — 4
Colorado — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Idaho§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 —
Montana§ — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 — 3
Nevada§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
New Mexico§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 1
Utah — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 1
Wyoming§ — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Pacific — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — —
Alaska N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
California — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — —
Hawaii N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
Oregon — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
American Samoa N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — —
Guam N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
Puerto Rico N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Illnesses with similar clinical presentation that result from Spotted fever group rickettsia infections are reported as Spotted fever rickettsioses. Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) caused 
by Rickettsia rickettsii, is the most common and well-known spotted fever.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
Streptococcus pneumoniae,† invasive disease
Reporting area
All ages Age <5 Syphilis, primary and secondary
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 118 60 434 6,757 1,679 20 48 160 1,088 1,212 47 236 413 4,034 5,596
New England 25 2 98 413 28 — 1 24 34 42 5 7 22 173 135
Connecticut 24 0 93 217 — — 0 22 22 — — 1 10 35 29
Maine§ — 1 6 60 7 — 0 2 6 1 — 0 3 14 1
Massachusetts — 0 1 — 2 — 0 3 — 32 3 5 12 103 91
New Hampshire — 0 7 56 — — 0 2 3 6 1 0 1 6 10
Rhode Island§ — 0 7 40 11 — 0 1 2 1 1 0 5 13 4
Vermont§ 1 0 6 40 8 — 0 1 1 2 — 0 2 2 —
Mid. Atlantic 13 6 44 551 97 5 6 52 151 144 24 33 47 672 749
New Jersey — 0 5 48 — — 1 4 27 24 5 4 12 93 100
New York (Upstate) 4 2 12 92 39 4 3 19 67 69 2 2 11 40 45
New York City 6 1 22 170 3 1 1 28 30 41 10 18 39 391 462
Pennsylvania 3 2 21 241 55 — 0 5 27 10 7 6 14 148 142
E.N. Central 13 13 75 930 387 2 8 18 165 203 — 24 44 267 579
Illinois — 0 7 43 — — 1 5 37 34 — 13 21 7 278
Indiana — 5 20 227 156 — 1 6 26 40 — 2 9 43 69
Michigan 2 1 26 342 18 — 1 6 42 39 — 4 13 88 90
Ohio 11 8 19 227 213 2 2 6 51 69 — 7 13 129 125
Wisconsin — 0 20 91 — — 0 2 9 21 — 0 2 — 17
W.N. Central 4 4 182 474 99 1 3 12 88 89 — 5 12 74 126
Iowa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 2 2 11
Kansas — 1 7 55 40 — 0 2 11 13 — 0 3 4 9
Minnesota — 0 179 269 18 — 1 10 41 29 — 1 4 15 33
Missouri 1 1 8 63 33 1 1 3 26 31 — 3 8 49 67
Nebraska§ 3 0 7 67 — — 0 2 9 5 — 0 1 4 4
North Dakota — 0 10 16 6 — 0 1 — 4 — 0 1 — 2
South Dakota — 0 2 4 2 — 0 1 1 7 — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic 47 30 143 1,789 762 9 12 28 292 302 6 60 218 1,021 1,278
Delaware — 0 3 18 10 — 0 2 — — — 0 3 3 14
District of Columbia — 1 4 17 12 — 0 1 6 2 — 3 8 49 73
Florida 31 16 89 863 459 8 3 18 112 114 2 19 32 361 460
Georgia 4 10 28 289 210 — 4 12 81 69 — 13 167 169 244
Maryland§ 8 0 25 248 4 — 1 6 30 46 — 6 12 95 110
North Carolina — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 10 31 171 211
South Carolina§ 4 0 25 274 — 1 1 4 29 28 1 2 6 54 49
Virginia§ — 0 4 26 — — 1 4 24 29 3 4 22 116 113
West Virginia — 1 21 54 67 — 0 4 10 14 — 0 2 3 4
E.S. Central 5 5 50 630 172 1 2 8 60 71 2 20 39 320 481
Alabama§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 6 17 100 188
Kentucky 2 1 15 89 48 1 0 2 7 7 — 1 13 29 24
Mississippi — 1 6 32 25 — 0 2 6 7 — 5 17 72 83
Tennessee§ 3 2 44 509 99 — 2 7 47 57 2 7 15 119 186
W.S. Central 8 4 89 879 63 1 6 41 144 171 6 45 72 630 1,148
Arkansas§ — 1 8 63 30 — 0 3 9 23 3 6 14 101 76
Louisiana — 1 8 43 33 — 0 3 16 16 — 8 27 64 353
Oklahoma 1 0 5 31 — 1 1 5 31 28 3 1 6 24 39
Texas§ 7 0 81 742 — — 3 34 88 104 — 27 46 441 680
Mountain 1 3 82 949 69 — 5 12 134 172 1 9 18 141 211
Arizona — 0 51 464 — — 2 7 59 78 1 3 10 53 104
Colorado — 0 20 270 — — 1 4 36 27 — 2 5 41 38
Idaho§ — 0 1 8 — — 0 1 4 4 — 0 1 2 2
Montana§ — 0 1 8 — — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Nevada§ — 1 4 36 27 — 0 1 4 6 — 1 10 34 37
New Mexico§ — 0 8 79 — — 0 4 12 19 — 1 4 7 19
Utah 1 1 9 76 35 — 1 4 17 37 — 0 2 4 11
Wyoming§ — 0 2 8 7 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 1 — —
Pacific 2 0 14 142 2 1 0 7 20 18 3 40 59 736 889
Alaska — 0 9 59 — — 0 5 15 11 — 0 0 — —
California 2 0 12 83 — 1 0 2 5 — 3 35 54 647 791
Hawaii — 0 1 — 2 — 0 1 — 7 — 0 3 14 16
Oregon — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 5 6 20
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 3 7 69 62
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 3 17 73 84
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional.
† Includes drug resistant and susceptible cases of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae disease among children <5 years and among all ages. Case definition: Isolation of S. pneumoniae from 
a normally sterile body site (e.g., blood or cerebrospinal fluid).
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending May 29, 2010, and May 30, 2009 (21st week)*
West Nile virus disease†
Reporting area
Varicella (chickenpox)§ Neuroinvasive Nonneuroinvasive¶
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 322 329 587 6,868 12,252 — 0 46 1 3 — 0 49 — 5
New England — 17 36 289 484 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Connecticut — 7 20 119 242 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Maine§ — 4 15 96 80 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Massachusetts — 0 2 — 4 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
New Hampshire — 3 10 54 96 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Rhode Island§ — 0 12 8 18 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Vermont§ — 1 10 12 44 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic 28 32 69 704 1,123 — 0 2 — — — 0 1 — —
New Jersey — 8 28 232 232 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
New York (Upstate) N 0 0 N N — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
New York City — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Pennsylvania 28 22 53 472 891 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
E.N. Central 65 107 193 2,459 3,877 — 0 4 — — — 0 3 — —
Illinois — 26 49 628 966 — 0 3 — — — 0 0 — —
Indiana§ — 6 35 236 291 — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Michigan 19 35 84 805 1,107 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Ohio 46 28 58 721 1,231 — 0 0 — — — 0 2 — —
Wisconsin — 6 57 69 282 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
W.N. Central 4 12 40 258 823 — 0 5 — — — 0 11 — 1
Iowa N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
Kansas§ — 4 18 90 364 — 0 1 — — — 0 2 — —
Minnesota — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Missouri 4 6 16 143 389 — 0 2 — — — 0 1 — —
Nebraska§ N 0 0 N N — 0 2 — — — 0 6 — —
North Dakota — 0 26 23 38 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
South Dakota — 0 7 2 32 — 0 3 — — — 0 2 — 1
S. Atlantic 61 36 94 1,045 1,515 — 0 4 — — — 0 2 — —
Delaware§ — 0 3 11 4 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 4 7 21 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Florida§ 48 15 57 581 781 — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Georgia N 0 0 N N — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Maryland§ N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
North Carolina N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
South Carolina§ — 0 34 68 88 — 0 2 — — — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ — 10 34 162 401 — 0 2 — — — 0 0 — —
West Virginia 13 8 26 216 220 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
E.S. Central 7 6 28 143 323 — 0 6 1 — — 0 4 — —
Alabama§ 7 6 27 142 320 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Kentucky N 0 0 N N — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — —
Mississippi — 0 1 1 3 — 0 5 1 — — 0 4 — —
Tennessee§ N 0 0 N N — 0 2 — — — 0 1 — —
W.S. Central 148 70 285 1,403 2,860 — 0 19 — 2 — 0 6 — 1
Arkansas§ — 4 50 69 339 — 0 1 — 1 — 0 0 — —
Louisiana — 2 8 25 60 — 0 2 — — — 0 4 — —
Oklahoma N 0 0 N N — 0 2 — — — 0 2 — —
Texas§ 148 61 272 1,309 2,461 — 0 16 — 1 — 0 4 — 1
Mountain 9 25 48 551 1,181 — 0 12 — — — 0 17 — 3
Arizona — 0 0 — — — 0 4 — — — 0 2 — —
Colorado§ — 11 41 211 637 — 0 7 — — — 0 14 — 1
Idaho§ N 0 0 N N — 0 3 — — — 0 5 — —
Montana§ 6 3 17 104 101 — 0 1 — — — 0 1 — —
Nevada§ N 0 0 N N — 0 2 — — — 0 1 — —
New Mexico§ — 1 7 49 81 — 0 2 — — — 0 1 — —
Utah 3 7 22 177 362 — 0 1 — — — 0 0 — 1
Wyoming§ — 0 3 10 — — 0 1 — — — 0 2 — 1
Pacific — 1 5 16 66 — 0 12 — 1 — 0 12 — —
Alaska — 0 4 16 37 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
California — 0 0 — — — 0 8 — 1 — 0 6 — —
Hawaii — 0 2 — 29 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oregon N 0 0 N N — 0 1 — — — 0 4 — —
Washington N 0 0 N N — 0 6 — — — 0 3 — —
American Samoa N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 2 8 — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 6 30 101 260 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Incidence data for reporting years 2009 and 2010 are provisional. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS, and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for California 
serogroup, eastern equine, Powassan, St. Louis, and western equine diseases are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
¶ Not reportable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not reportable are excluded from this table, except starting in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenza-
associated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/infdis.htm.
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TABLE III. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending May 29, 2010 (21st week)
Reporting area
All causes, by age (years)
P&I† 
Total Reporting area




Ages ≥65 45–64 25–44 1–24 <1
All  
Ages ≥65 45–64 25–44 1–24 <1
New England 477 351 89 20 9 8 33 S. Atlantic 1,255 790 315 88 28 28 70
Boston, MA 125 88 27 6 4 — 10 Atlanta, GA 128 79 31 10 7 1 6
Bridgeport, CT 26 21 4 1 — — 3 Baltimore, MD 161 90 50 18 1 2 12
Cambridge, MA 23 21 2 — — — 2 Charlotte, NC 108 68 25 10 3 2 6
Fall River, MA 20 15 4 1 — — 1 Jacksonville, FL 167 110 40 11 3 3 9
Hartford, CT 46 27 13 2 3 1 3 Miami, FL 173 114 38 7 4 4 7
Lowell, MA 31 27 3 1 — — 4 Norfolk, VA 62 43 10 3 2 4 2
Lynn, MA 7 4 3 — — — — Richmond, VA 41 23 12 3 2 1 2
New Bedford, MA 18 18 — — — — 1 Savannah, GA 57 38 11 4 2 2 5
New Haven, CT 14 11 2 1 — — — St. Petersburg, FL 51 28 12 8 — 3 5
Providence, RI 49 38 9 1 — 1 1 Tampa, FL 187 124 48 9 2 4 9
Somerville, MA 2 1 1 — — — — Washington, D.C. 112 67 36 5 2 2 6
Springfield, MA 38 25 7 1 1 4 3 Wilmington, DE 8 6 2 — — — 1
Waterbury, CT 23 13 8 1 1 — — E.S. Central 857 552 214 58 21 12 86
Worcester, MA 55 42 6 5 — 2 5 Birmingham, AL 132 84 31 14 1 2 16
Mid. Atlantic 1,705 1,181 385 89 31 19 89 Chattanooga, TN 78 53 20 2 2 1 2
Albany, NY 44 28 13 — 1 2 2 Knoxville, TN 102 75 21 4 1 1 13
Allentown, PA 25 19 4 2 — — — Lexington, KY 68 36 22 9 1 — 4
Buffalo, NY 76 52 16 4 4 — 5 Memphis, TN 175 118 40 11 5 1 29
Camden, NJ 14 8 3 3 — — 2 Mobile, AL 113 75 30 4 4 — 11
Elizabeth, NJ 24 17 6 1 — — 2 Montgomery, AL 41 30 8 2 — 1 4
Erie, PA 36 26 4 4 1 1 4 Nashville, TN 148 81 42 12 7 6 7
Jersey City, NJ U U U U U U U W.S. Central 1,088 695 271 71 25 25 49
New York City, NY 989 688 233 46 13 9 46 Austin, TX 61 36 14 4 1 6 6
Newark, NJ 36 18 6 10 2 — 1 Baton Rouge, LA 73 47 15 6 5 — —
Paterson, NJ 18 14 3 — 1 — 2 Corpus Christi, TX 65 39 17 5 2 2 7
Philadelphia, PA 141 84 39 8 6 4 8 Dallas, TX 176 105 43 19 4 5 9
Pittsburgh, PA§ 36 25 9 2 — — 2 El Paso, TX 91 61 17 6 4 2 1
Reading, PA 39 29 8 — — 2 1 Fort Worth, TX U U U U U U U
Rochester, NY 71 50 17 2 1 1 4 Houston, TX 159 99 46 6 1 7 8
Schenectady, NY 26 23 1 2 — — 1 Little Rock, AR 64 45 16 3 — — —
Scranton, PA 21 15 6 — — — 1 New Orleans, LA U U U U U U U
Syracuse, NY 53 44 6 2 1 — 4 San Antonio, TX 230 156 55 12 5 2 14
Trenton, NJ 26 19 5 2 — — 1 Shreveport, LA 56 39 13 3 1 — 3
Utica, NY 15 9 4 1 1 — 3 Tulsa, OK 113 68 35 7 2 1 1
Yonkers, NY 15 13 2 — — — — Mountain 1,073 705 244 74 25 23 54
E.N. Central 1,861 1,229 446 119 30 37 112 Albuquerque, NM 112 70 24 13 3 2 9
Akron, OH 53 36 11 3 2 1 5 Boise, ID 42 28 11 2 — 1 4
Canton, OH 32 24 6 2 — — 4 Colorado Springs, CO 48 35 7 2 3 1 1
Chicago, IL 289 179 81 22 2 5 5 Denver, CO 94 58 25 6 2 3 2
Cincinnati, OH 87 60 17 5 5 — 6 Las Vegas, NV 269 181 65 20 2 1 19
Cleveland, OH 208 148 47 9 2 2 5 Ogden, UT 24 19 3 — 2 — 2
Columbus, OH 177 111 46 14 4 2 15 Phoenix, AZ 175 87 48 23 6 11 5
Dayton, OH 132 94 29 5 2 2 13 Pueblo, CO 32 23 8 1 — — 1
Detroit, MI 100 52 35 9 3 1 6 Salt Lake City, UT 118 87 21 5 2 3 5
Evansville, IN 60 48 10 2 — — 4 Tucson, AZ 159 117 32 2 5 1 6
Fort Wayne, IN 65 47 8 3 2 5 6 Pacific 1,644 1,127 365 85 35 31 153
Gary, IN 15 9 1 3 1 1 1 Berkeley, CA 9 7 1 — — 1 —
Grand Rapids, MI 52 28 15 4 — 5 4 Fresno, CA 116 78 30 5 1 2 16
Indianapolis, IN 197 122 55 13 4 3 14 Glendale, CA 27 21 3 2 1 — 4
Lansing, MI 39 32 5 2 — — 3 Honolulu, HI 86 64 18 3 — 1 7
Milwaukee, WI 75 43 25 4 — 3 3 Long Beach, CA 56 34 17 3 1 1 7
Peoria, IL 64 45 15 3 — 1 3 Los Angeles, CA 248 160 59 14 11 4 28
Rockford, IL 48 30 10 5 1 2 4 Pasadena, CA 35 26 5 2 2 — 6
South Bend, IN 51 34 10 6 — 1 4 Portland, OR 99 61 28 5 4 1 7
Toledo, OH 73 54 12 4 — 3 7 Sacramento, CA 209 145 45 10 1 8 19
Youngstown, OH 44 33 8 1 2 — — San Diego, CA 158 113 29 7 6 3 10
W.N. Central 567 367 139 37 13 11 39 San Francisco, CA 112 79 21 6 2 3 14
Des Moines, IA 80 59 15 5 1 — 4 San Jose, CA 193 140 40 10 1 2 17
Duluth, MN 34 28 5 — 1 — 2 Santa Cruz, CA 30 20 6 3 — 1 3
Kansas City, KS 29 15 10 4 — — 2 Seattle, WA 103 73 19 8 1 2 7
Kansas City, MO 98 62 22 7 5 2 8 Spokane, WA 70 48 17 2 1 2 3
Lincoln, NE 52 35 14 1 1 1 4 Tacoma, WA 93 58 27 5 3 — 5
Minneapolis, MN 48 32 8 6 1 1 5 Total¶ 10,527 6,997 2,468 641 217 194 685
Omaha, NE 68 43 18 3 1 3 6
St. Louis, MO 36 8 18 8 — 2 3
St. Paul, MN 48 31 13 2 2 — 3
Wichita, KS 74 54 16 1 1 2 2
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   
* Mortality data in this table are voluntarily reported from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of >100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and 
by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included.
† Pneumonia and influenza.
§ Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.
¶ Total includes unknown ages.
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